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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.
ANTHONY JAMES VALDEZ,

CaseNo.20040633-SC

Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
UPON GRANT OF CERTIORARI REVIEW
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State appeals the decision in State v. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, 95 P.2d 291,
which reversed defendant's convictions for aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (West 2004); possession of a dangerous weapon by
a restricted person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76- 10-503(2)(a)
(West 2004); and criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-106 (West 2004). See Addendum A (Opinion). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to its grant of certiorari review. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (West 2004). See
Addendum B (Order Granting Certiorari Review).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARDS OF APPELLATE
REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUES
The State raises two issues concerning the court of appeals' analysis and application
of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibiting racial discrimination in the exercise
ofperemptory strikes), and its progeny, J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (prohibiting
peremptory strikes based solely on gender). Because the analytical underpinnings are
identical, "Batson" will be used generically to refer to both racial- and gender-based
objections.
Issue 1: Is a Batson objection timely if it is made after the trial jury is sworn and the
remainder of the venire excused?
Issue 2: Did the court of appeals fail to apply the Batson standards and analysis
established by this Court and the United States Supreme Court?
Standards of Review: On certiorari, the decision of the court of appeal is reviewed
for correctness. Thomas v. Color Country Management, 2004 UT 12, \ 9, 84 P.3d 1201.
What constitutes a timely objection is a question of law. Cf. State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ^f
38, 24 P.3d 948 (for-cause challenge). The determination of the applicable legal standards
is also a question of law. See Thomas, 2004 UT 12,19; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936
(Utah 1994).
Preservation: This Court granted certiorari review of Issues 1 & 2, which were
raised by the State and addressed in Valdez, 2004 UT App 214. See Add A&B. See also
Brief of Appellee [BrAplee] at 12-39.
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STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Rule 185 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is attached in Addendum C, together with
any other provision cited in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, child abuse,
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, and criminal mischief (R. 35-38).
A jury trial was held on October 29-30, 2002 (R. 131-34).
The initial jury venire consisted of 11 men and 14 women (R. 94). Voir dire was fully
conducted (R209: 10-66). Three men and two women were excused for cause without
objection (R. 94). A third woman was excused for cause on defendant's motion over the
prosecutor's objection (R. 94; R209: 66-69). The prosecutor used four peremptory strikes
against women; the defense used four peremptory strikes against men (R. 94). The selected
jury consisted of four men and four women (R. 94). Defendant did not object when the
prosecutor exercised his peremptory strikes or when the selected jurors were announced
(R209: 70).
The remainder of the venire was excused from service (id.). The trial jury was sworn
(id.). The court trial preliminarily instructed the jury (R209: 70-76). The information was
read (R209: 76). The jury was excused for lunch (id.).
After the jurors left the courtroom, the court discussed potential jury instructions with
counsel (R209: 76-78). Defendant stipulated that a previous conviction for a violent felony
rendered him a "restricted person" for purposes of the weapon charge (R209: 77-78). The
3

parties agreed that the jury would not be informed of defendant's prior conviction and a
special verdict form would be used to determine if he possessed a gun on the date charged

ad.).
The court then asked the parties if they had "[ajnything else" to discuss before the
noon recess (R209: 78). For the first time, defense counsel questioned the prosecutor's
peremptory strikes: "Your Honor, I noticed that when we were doing the jury selection that
the State struck all women, and that's a basis for a Batson challenge" (R209: 78). The trial
court pointed out that Batson was not a gender-based case (id.). Defense counsel continued:
Whatever the follow-up case is that extended Batson [sic], the gender, and I
think at this point all I need to do is establish that there was a pattern. And I
think the fact that the State used all of their peremptories on women - 1 don't
know if there's any better evidence to show that there is a pattern of- based
on gender. I don't think we had any minorities at all, even Ms. Gonzalez
didn't appear to be Hispanic, so I don't think I'd have any based on race, but
on the fact that the State moved every single one of the peremptories were
based on-.
(id.).1 See Addendum D (Objection and Ruling).
The prosecutor responded: "[Djefense counsel's objection is untimely. We've seated
the jury, sworn the jury, the proper Batson challenge must be made prior to that point" (id.).

*The court of appeals overstated the basis of defendant's objection: "Valdez's
counsel noted that the State used all four of its peremptory challenges to exclude women
from the jury. Valdez further noted that in a domestic violence jury trial, gender issues
tend to be highly charged. Ultimately, he argued, the State's exclusion of only women
from the jury cannot be disregarded, on its face, in the context of the case." Valdez, 2004
UTApp 214,^2.
4

The trial court asked: "Well, not withstanding that, can you give me a basis to rebut
[a] Batson type challenge?" (R209:19)?
The prosecutor then explained his peremptory strikes against Lydia Valerio, Joyce
Gonzalez, Tamara Thornton, and Paula Morley (R. 94; R209: 79-80). See Add, D.
Lydia Valerio was the officer manager for a state-wide non-profit agency which
provides medical, housing, training, and employment assistance to brain-injured individuals
(R209:14-16). See Addendum E (Voir Dire Examination). Valerio was personally involved
in retraining individuals with sustained brain injuries and in providing housing and medical
referrals to others (id.). The prosecutor explained that he struck her because of her
employment, which he believed might make her "somewhat overly compassionate" (R209:
79) {Add. D).
Joyce Gonzalez cleaned her adult children's homes (R209: 18-19) {Add. E). She
wanted to "retire," but her children, all in their forties, would not let her quit (id.). She
claimed to have heard about the case on the news (R209: 35) {Add. E). She remembered
"hearing about the break-in in the area, just the address," which she claimed was "Ensign
Avenue" (R209: 65). When the court informed her that the incident had not happened on
Ensign Avenue, but on Emery Street, Gonzalez asserted that she was certain it was the same
incident because "I read the newspaper every day" (R209:65-66) {Add. E). She admitted that

2

Based on this question, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court
"ignor[ed] the State's argument... [and] impliedly found good cause under rule 18
[Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure] to allow a challenge to the State's peremptory strikes
beyond the usual [time] limits." Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, \ 10.
5

her memory was vague, but insisted she remembered the "name and the incident" and knew
the facts "sounded familiar to me" (R209: 66). When asked if she could disregard any prior
information she may heard about the case in reaching a verdict, Gonzalez only answered, "I
think I could" (id.). The prosecutor peremptorily struck her based on her voir dire responses.
He felt that even though she claimed that her prior knowledge of the case would not affect
her judgment, her responses were too "matter of fact" (R209: 79) (Add. D).
Tamara Thornton worked for her husband's family-owned plumbing and heating
business (R209:14). She remembered hearing about a house break-in on the television news,
but was not sure if it was the same case and could not remember any details (R209: 34). She
had previously served on a jury, which returned a verdict of manslaughter (R209: 49-50).
See Add. E. The prosecutor noted that, like Gonzalez, Thornton had heard about the case
(R209: 79) (Add. D). But due to the lapse of time between jury selection and defendant's
Batson objection, the prosecutor could not recall specifically what Thornton had said about
the case (R209: 79). The prosecutor explained that he struck Thornton because she had
previously served on a jury, which had returned a verdict of manslaughter, a verdict the
prosecutor assumed represented a "one-step reduction" from the charged offense (id.).
Paula Morley was a part-time Title I-fimded school aide, who also taught piano at
home (R209: 27-28) (Add. £). The prosecutor explained that he had "agonized" over
whether he should use his last strike against her or the next juror, Ron Hardy, who was a
Vietnam veteran, hunted as a hobby, and had a brother in prison, whom Hardy believed was
properly incarcerated (R209: 29-30, 45-46, 79-80). The prosecutor explained that he had
6

consulted with his co-prosecutor, who favored keeping Mr. Hardy on the jury based on his
firearm experience (R209: 79-80) (Add. D). As with Valerio, the prosecutor felt that
Morley's employment might make her "overly compassionate" and more inclined to "let
bygones be bygones" (R209: 80). Comparing Morley with Hardy, he chose to remove
Morley (id.).
After the prosecutor explained his strikes, defense counsel was silent and did not
object to the explanations or assert contrary facts (R209: 80). The trial court then ruled:
All right. Thank you. And Pm satisfied with your explanation. I find with
regard to peremptory challenges No. 6, Tamara Thornton, No. 7 Linda Valerio,
No. 10, Joyce Gonzalez, and No. 19, Paula Morely [sic] are gender neutral,
they are related specifically to this case. They were clearly stated and they are
specific and legitimate. Therefore I am denying the challenge based on
gender. I also note this is a jury of four men and four women.
(R209: 80) (Add. D). Again, defense counsel remained silent and did not object to the ruling
or ask for additional findings (id.).
Trial proceeded. Defendant was acquitted of aggravated assault of his girlfriend,
Chrystal Jimenez, who recanted her prior statements implicating defendant, and of child
abuse (committing domestic violence in the presence of their son) (R. 138-42; R211: 14748). The jury convicted defendant of aggravated burglary of Laura Abeyta's (Chrystal's
friend's) apartment and of criminal mischief for slashing Chrystal's car tires (id.). He was
also convicted of the weapon charge (R211: 147-49). On January 13, 2003, defendant was
sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment (R. 178-80).

7

Defendant appealed his convictions (R. 184-85). The appeal was poured over to the
court of appeals.
The court of appeals concluded that rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, allows
a Batson objection to be made any time "before evidence is presented" and, consequently,
held that defendant's objection—made after the jury was sworn and the remainder of the
venire excused, but prior the taking of evidence—was timely. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214,
fflf 7-11. See also Addendum C (Rule 18). Turning to the merits, the appellate court
acknowledged that the prosecutor's explanations for the peremptory strikes were not
inherently discriminatory. Id. at ^ 21 & 29. Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded
that the explanations were "mere pretext as a matter of law" because they were not "tied to
the issues, evidence, and context of the case at hand." Id. at *| 29. The court of appeals held
that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to reject the prosecutor's explanations
"outright" and instead proceeded to assess their credibility and validity. Id. at f 31.
Accordingly, the court of appeals refused to review the trial court's ultimate finding that the
strikes were made without discriminatory intent and reversed the trial court's denial of
defendant's Batson objection. Id.
Because the court of appeals reversed defendant's convictions based on its Batson
determination, it did not address defendant's other claim that evidence of Battered Woman
Syndrome (BWS) was erroneously admitted. Id. at If 17 n.2.
The State petitioned for and was granted certiorari review of Valdez's Batson analysis
and rulings. See Add. B.
8

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts underlying defendant's convictions are not relevant to the Batson issues
raised on certiorari review. Only a brief summary is provided.
Defendant forced open the door of Laura Abeyta's apartment (R210: 16-18, 25-26,
33-36,44,49-50). Laura, other adults, and their children were in the living room (R210:1112, 15, 18-20, 33-34, 48; R211: 94-95). Defendant displayed a gun and walked into the
bathroom where his girlfriend, Chrystal Jimenez, was hiding (R210: 15, 18-20, 35, 37, 5051). He threatened to kill Chrystal in front of their young son (id.). Defendant then left the
apartment and slashed the tires on Chrystal's car (R210:38-39,52). Chrystal fully recounted
the incident during defendant's preliminary hearing, but at trial, recanted her prior statements
and testimony (R207: 4-13; R210: 59-65, 80-82, 97-99). See Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, ^
4. Laura and the other eyewitnesses implicated defendant (R210:11-54; R211: 94-96). The
jury acquitted ciefendant of the assaults involving Chrystal and their son, but convicted him
of aggravated burglary (for the forced entry), felon in possession of a gun, and criminal
mischief (for slashing the tires) (R211: 146-48).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Issue 1 -^ Timeliness. Until Valdez, federal and state courts, including the Utah Court
of Appeals, uniformly recognized that a Batson objection to a peremptory strike is untimely
if it is made after the jury process is completed. Strong policy reasons support strict
enforcement of this time requirement. Moreover, requiring a Batson objection to be made
prior to the trial jury being sworn and the remainder of the venire excused is consistent with
9

the contemporaneous objection rule and parallels the time restrictions placed on other types
of objections to the composition of a jury. This Court should reverse the court of appeals'
singular conclusion to the contrary.
Issue 2 - Batson Analysis. This Court, as well as the United States Supreme Court,
have established clear and distinct criteria for each of Batson's three analytical steps,
including applicable standards of review. The court of appeals failed to apply these
standards in Valdez. Had the court of appeals applied the proper standards, it would have
concluded that the prosecutor's explanations for his peremptory strikes were gender-neutral
and would have affirmed the trial court's ultimate determination of no discriminatory intent.
If this Court determines defendant's Batson objection was untimely, it should reverse
Part I of the Valdez opinion, but nevertheless clarify what constitutes proper Batson analysis
and standards. If the objection is timely, this Court should review its merits, reverse Parts
II-IV of the Valdez opinion, affirm the trial court's finding of no discriminatory intent, and
reinstate defendant's convictions. In either case, the appeal should then be remanded to the
court of appeals only for determination of defendant's remaining evidentiary claim.

10

ARGUMENT
POINTI
PRECEDENT AND POLICY DO NOT SUPPORT VALDEZS SINGULAR
CONCLUSION THAT A BATSON OBJECTION IS TIMELY IF MADE
AFTER THE JURYIS SWORN AND THE REMAINDER OF THE VENIRE
IS EXCUSED
"Ordinarily, a party is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory challenges for any
reason at all, as long as that reason is related to his view concerning the outcome of the case
to be tried." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). The privilege, however, "is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection
Clause," which forbids a party from striking a potential juror solely on account of race or
gender or on the assumption that a particular race or gender is unable to impartially consider
the evidence. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (race); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130-31
(1994) (gender). See also State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, \ 14, 994 P.2d 177; State v.
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1996).
Under Batson and its progeny, a three step analysis applies:
[0]nce the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie
case of [ ] discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the
proponent of the strike to come forward with a [ ] neutral explanation (step
two). If a [ ] neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide
(step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful [ ]
discrimination.
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995).
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547.

11

Accord Colwell, 2000 UT 8, % 17;

"Discrimination injury selection, whether based on race or on gender, causes harm
to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from
participation in the process. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140. Consequently, "if purposeful
discrimination is ultimately found, reversal of the defendant's conviction is mandated,
without regard to the harmlessness of the constitutional error." State v. Macial, 854 P.2d
543, 545 (Utah App.) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 100), cert denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah
1993).
In Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, 95 P.3d 291, the court of appeals acknowledges these
standards, but misinterprets and misapplies them. These errors will be discussed in Point II.
The court of appeals' initial error, however, is in ruling that a Batson objection to a
peremptory strike may be made after the jury process is completed. See Valdez, 2004 UT
App 214,fflf7-11. No other court has reached the same conclusion. Indeed, prior to Valdez,
Utah recognized that a Batson obj ection was untimely if it was made after the jury was sworn
and the remainder of the venire was excused. Strict enforcement of this time requirement is
consistent with precedent and rule and is supported by sound policy. Consequently, Part 1
of the Valdez opinion should be reversed.
A.

The Universal Requirement that a Batson Objection Be Made
During the Jury Selection Process.

A Batson objection must be timely. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99-100. See also
Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, ^ 7 (citing Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 116 P.2d 653, 655
(Utah App. 1989)). Due to the "variety of jury selection practices" in the United States,

12

however, what constitutes a timely objection is determined by each jurisdiction's procedural
practice. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24.
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions require a Batson objection to be made
after the jury is selected, but before the selected trial jurors are sworn. See, e.g., Ford v.
Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423 (1991) (calling this period "sensible"); State v. Robinson, 676
A.2d 384, 390 (Conn. 1996); State v. Aubrey, 609 So.2d 1183,1185 (La. App. 1992). See
also Wayne R. LaFave & JeroldH. Isreal 5 Criminal Procedure § 22.3} at 325 &n.l79 (2d
ed. 1999) and at 90 (2003 Supp.) [hereafter Crinu Procedure]. Some jurisdictions require
a Batson objection to be made even earlier, that is, as soon as a prima facie case of
discriminatory intent is evident. See Crinu Procedure, id.
Until Valdez, however, no jurisdiction permitted a Batson objection to be made after
the jury process was completed, that is, after the trial jury is sworn and the remainder of the
venire excused. See, e.g., Morning v. Zapata Protein (USA), Inc., 128 F.3d 213, 215 (4th
Cir. 1997) (recognizing that requiring a Batson obj ection to be made prior to the venire being
dismissed is a "modest and well-justified step" recognized in the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits); Garcia v. Excel Corp., 102 F.3d 758, 759 (5th Cir. 1997) (directing
trial courts to sua sponte reject & Batson objection if it is made after the venire is dismissed);
Robinson, 676 A.2d at 390 n. 12 (citing an extensive list ofjurisdictions which recognize that
the dismissal of the venire is the outside limit for & Batson objection, but the preferred time
is before the trial jury is sworn); State v. Ford, 2001 MT 230,39 F.3d 108,112 (Mont. 2001)
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(citing numerous state and federal decisions which bar a Batson objection after the remainder
of the venire is dismissed), cert denied, 537 U.S. 973 (2002).
Moreover, until Valdez, all jurisdictions—including Utah—recognized that Batson's
unique remedies justify strict enforcement of its timeliness requirement. If diBatson error
is found on appeal, prejudice is presumed and reversal mandated. See Batson, 476 U.S. at
100; Macial, 854 P.2d at 545. Consequently, quick and immediate resolution of diBatson
objection in the trial court is essential. Indeed, Batson contemplated that its objectives could
be achieved "without substantial disruption of the jury selection process." See Hernandez
v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358 (1991). The most effective and prompt corrective action is
immediately reinstating any wrongfully struck juror, a remedy which can only occur if the
Batson objection is made during the jury selection process. See McCrory v. Henderson, 82
F.3d 1243, 1247-49 (2nd Cir. 1996) (citing an extensive list of authorities in support).
In contrast, permitting a Batson objection after the jury selection process is completed
undermines the policy of the contemporaneous objection rule. The contemporaneous
objection rule requires a party to specifically and timely raise an objection so that trial court
has a fair opportunity to correct the error and avoid reversal on appeal. See State v.
McCardel, 652 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah 1982). If a Batson objection is made after the jury
selection process is completed, that policy is defeated. For if a violation is found only after
the venire has been dismissed, the wrongfully struck juror cannot be reinstated. At that point,
the only available remedy is mistrial-a remedy which is neither prompt, efficient, nor
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corrective of the discrimination committed. See McCrory, 82 F.3d at 1247; Ford, 39 P.3d
at 12.
A contemporaneous objection requirement is also designed to prevent invited error.
Cf. McCardel, 652 P.2d at 947. Allowing a Batson objection to be made after the jury
process is completed invites error because it "permit[s] the defendant to manipulate the
system to the extreme prejudice of the prosecution and give[s] the defendant a strong
inducement to delay raising the objection until trial is underway." See McCory, 82 F.3d at
1247-49 (extensively discussing the policy reasons for the strict enforcement of a timely
objection rule in Batson cases). Accord Morning, 128 F.3d at 215 (same).
Additionally, allowing a Batson objection to be made after the remainder of the
venire is excused hinders a prosecutor's ability to fully explain his strikes and the trial court's
ability to accurately assess the credibility of those explanations. If the stricken juror is in the
courtroom when a Batson objection is made, her name can more easily be matched to her
face and better correlated to her voir dire answers. See Aubrey, 609 So.2d at 1185-86
(recognizing that "an obvious advantage of a prompt ruling on Batson challenges is that
memories are fresh and a better record can be made of [ ] relevant factors [and] the neutral
reasons for challenging the jurors") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also
17 No. 3 Federal Litigator 71 (discussing similar reasoning adopted by the Second Circuit).
In sum, the universal rule requiring a Batson objection to be made during the jury
process permits prompt corrective action and prevents "costly mistrials and unnecessary
reversals." See Morning, 128 F.2d at 215. Valdez, however, ignores this overwhelming
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authority and sound policy. 2004 UT App 214, ^ 6-11. It claims that whatever the merits
of a strict timely objection rule, rule 18(c)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, permits a
Batson objection to be made after the jury selection process is completed and at any point
before trial evidence is presented. See id. at \ 11. As explained below, that holding is
incorrect.
B.

Utah's Pre- Valdez Requirement that a Batson Objection Be
Made During the Jury Selection Process.

Until Valdez, Utah recognized that diBatson objection should be made during the jury
selection process, that is, prior to the jury being sworn and the remainder of the venire
excused.
In Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 116 P.2d 653, 655-56 (Utah App. 1989), the Utah
Court of Appeals fully embraced the policy behind the universal rule and refused to exempt
a Batson objection from Utah's contemporaneous objection rule. Carlston failed to object
during the jury selection process when the county used all of its peremptory challenges to
remove three of four women on the jury. M a t 654. Trial was completed the same day. Id.
Two weeks later, Carlston filed a motion for new trial in which she claimed the county had
exercised its peremptory strikes with discriminatory intent. Id. The trial court denied the
motion. Id.
On appeal, the court of appeals held that Carlston waived consideration of her Batson
claim because she failed to timely object to the county's peremptory strikes. Carlston, 776
P.2d at 655. Carlston noted that for an objection to be timely, it must be "presented to the
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trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon." Id. In the Batson context, this
means before the trial jury is sworn and the remainder of the venire excused. Id. at 656.
Carlston recognized that if Batson objections were delayed beyond the jury selection
process, a defendant would be encouraged to "'sandbag['] the prosecution by waiting until
trial has concluded unsatisfactorily before insisting on an explanation for jury strikes that by
then the prosecutor may largely have forgotten." Id. (quoting United States v. Forbes, 816
F.2d 1006,1011 (5th Cir. 1987)). Carlston further recognized that a Batson objection made
during the jury selection process permits the trial court to easily remedy a discriminatory
strike "' simply by seating the wrongfully struck venireperson. After trial, the only remedy
is setting aside the conviction.'" Id. (quoting Forbes, id). Allowing a Batson objection to
be made after the venire is excused also adversely impacts the validity of the Batson ruling.
If the remainder of the venire is no longer in the courtroom, the accused attorney is hindered
in his ability to provide a full factual explanation for his strike and the trial court is hindered
in its ability to fully assess the credibility of that explanation and enter informed findings.
Id. at 656.
Valdez acknowledges Carlston, but minimizes its significance by referring to its
contemporaneous objection rule as "dicta." See Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, ^J 8. Carlston's
time limitation for a Batson objection (before the jury is sworn and the remainder of the
venire is excused) is not, however, advisory. To the contrary, Carlston recognized the
"universal" rule requiring a Batson objection to be made during the jury selection process,
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discussed the sound policy behind the rule, and then applied it to waive consideration of the
merits of Carlston's Batson's objection. See Carlston, 776 P.2d at 655-56.
Though this Court has not specifically addressed the time frame for a Batson
objection, it has concluded that, in general, discriminatory jury selection claims must be
raised before the jury is sworn.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-16(1) (West 2004) directs that any allegation that a jury was
selected in violation of the Jury Selection Act must be raised as soon as discovered, but "in
any event before the trial jury is sworn.59 See Add. C. Section 78-46-16 does not govern
constitutionally-based challenges, such as Batson. See State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 574
n. 115 (Utah 1987). Nevertheless, this Court has applied the statute's time limitation to both
statutory and constitutionally-based jury discrimination claims.
Prior to Tillman, this Court relied on section 78-46-16 in holding that a fair crosssection claim "must be lodged before the jury is sworn." State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216,
217 (Utah 1986). After Tillman, this Court likewise held that a constitutionally-based
challenge based on jury disproportionality was timely because it was raised as soon as the
grounds for the challenge became apparent and before the jury was sworn. Redd v. Negley,
785 P.2d 1098,1099-1100 (Utah 1989). Finally, in State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 337 (Utah
1991), the State conceded on appeal that Span's Batson objection was timely because it was
"made immediately after the peremptory challenges to the jurors were completed and before
the jury was sworn." This Court summarily accepted that concession as consistent with the
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time frames recognized in Bankhead, section 78-48-16, and rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Span, 819 P.2d at 337.
Here, the court of appeals relied exclusively on rule 18 to find defendant's Batson
objection timely. See Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, <[ 11. While rule 18 is consistent with the
universal time limitation fox & Batson objection, the rule is not controlling.
Rule 18 governs the jury selection process in criminal cases. Subsection (c)(2) of the
rule states:
A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for cause. A
challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is sworn to
try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after
the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented . . .
See Add, C. By its plain language, rule 18(c)(2) imposes the time limit for challenging the
retention of a juror. The rule does not, however, control an objection to the removal of a
juror. Nevertheless, like section 78-46-16, rule 18(c)(2)'s time frame—before the jury is
sworn—is consistent with the universally-recognized time period for a Batson objection
adopted in Carlston,
Rule 18(c)(2) recognizes a good cause exception to its time requirement. A party,
who fails to timely challenge an individual juror, may challenge that juror up until the trial
evidence is presented, if the party establishes good cause for its delayed objection. See Add,
C, In other words, the rule permits a party to challenge the retention of a selectedjuror up
until the evidentiary stage of a trial, if the party establishes good cause for its failure to raise
a challenge for-cause or to peremptorily strike the juror during the selection process. See
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Rule 18(c) (Add. C). Despite the limited scope of rule 18(c)(2), the court of appeals in this
case erroneously concludes that rule 18!s good cause exception permits consideration of
defendant's otherwise untimely Batson challenge. See Valdez, 2004 UT App ^f 10.
Valdez cites State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App.), cert denied, 817 P.2d 327
(Utah 1991), in support of its good cause analysis. In Harrison, a Batson objection was
made "immediately after the jury was sworn in, before the challengedjurors were excused
from service, and before opening statements of counsel," that is, during a time period when
an improperly struck juror could be easily reinstated. See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776
(emphasis added). The Harrison panel concluded that section 78-36-16rs time period was
not controlling. Id. at 776 (citing Tillman, 750 P.2d at 574 n.115). Sua sponte, the panel
then considered rule 18fs time frame and summarily concluded that though Harrison's
objection was untimely (made after the jury was swom), its merits could nevertheless be
considered pursuant to rule 18fs good cause exception because it was made "before the
challenged jurors were excused from service" and before any trial evidence was presented.
Id. at 776.
In applying rule 18 to a Batson objection, Harrison did not acknowledge Carlston
or any other Batson-b&szd authority. Nevertheless, because the remainder of the venire was
still in the courtroom and had not been dismissed when Harrison made his Batson objection,
the Harrison decision does not contradict the universal rule and Carlston's time limitation.
Valdez fails to recognize this distinction. Instead, Valdez concludes that Harrison and
rule 18 permit a Batson objection to be made "before any of the evidence is presented,"
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regardless of whether the trial jury was sworn and the remainder of the venire dismissed. See
2004 UT App 214, ^j 11. No Utah case or decision from any other jurisdiction has gone this
far in permitting a Batson objection. See discussion, supra.
Contrary to Valdez, the time requirement recognized in Carlston—before the jury is
sworn and the venire dismissed—is not a new rule or a modification of rule 18. See Valdez,
2004 UT App 214, f 11. Over twenty years of jurisprudence establishes that a Batson
objection must be timely raised or waived and that, in the context of Batson and Utah
procedure, a timely Batson objection is one made during the jury selection process, that is,
before the jury is sworn. But even if good cause permits extension of this period, the
objection must still be made during the jury selection process, that is, at the outside, before
the remainder of the venire is excused.
C.

Valdez's Erroneous Conclusion that Good Cause Excused
Defendant's Untimely Batson Objection.

Even assuming arguendo rule 18 and its good cause exception controlled Batson
objections, here no good cause excused defendant's untimely objection. See In re Rights to
the Use of Water, 2004 UT 106, \ 43, 515 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (recognizing that "[g]ood
cause occurs when special circumstances essentially beyond a party's control excuse the late"
action and "justify suspending a strict application of a [ ] deadline").
In this case, it was self-evident that the prosecutor used all his peremptory strikes
against women (R. 94). Yet, defendant made no objection when the strikes were made, made
no objection when the selectedjurors were announced, made no objection when the trial jury
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was sworn, made no objection when the remainder of the venire was dismissed, made no
objection when the sworn jurors were excused for lunch, and made no objection during a
subsequent in-chambers conference until the court casually asked the parties if there was
anything else to discuss before they recessed for lunch (R209: 78) (Add. D). Only then did
defendant summarily raise a Batson objection (id.). See Point II And when the prosecutor
responded that the Batson objection was not timely, defendant did not claim that it was
timely or that good cause justified its untimeliness. He simply remained silent (R209:78-80)
(Add. D). The trial court then asked the prosecutor, "Well not withstanding that, can you
give me a basis to rebut the Batson type challenge?" (R209: 79).
Contrary to Valdez, the trial court's question does not constitute an implicit finding
of good cause. See 2004 UT App 214, ^f 10. The request simply suggests that despite the
untimeliness of defendant's objection, the trial court believed it was best to make a record
of the merits. Accord State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450,458 n.8 (Utah 1994) (noting trial court
considered the merits of the Batson claim as a cautionary measure and to "complete [the]
record").
Even if the trial court's question is viewed as an implicit finding of good cause, such
a finding would constitute an abuse of discretion here because defendant did not claim that
good cause excused his untimely objection and good cause is not otherwise apparent on the
record. Compare Garcia, 102 F.3d at 759 (concluding that sound policy bars appellate
review of an untimely objection, even when the trial court considers its merits), Richardson
v. McGriff, 762 A.2d 48,63-64 (Md. App. 2000) (recognizing that substantial policy reasons
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bar appellate consideration of a Batson objection made after the jury is sworn and venire
dismissed, even when the trial court fully considers the merits), with State v. Belgard, 830
P.2d 264,266 (Utah 1992) (finding no policy concerns barred appellate consideration of an
untimely motion to suppress, which was fully considered in an evidentiary hearing below);
and State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1160 (Utah 1991) (recognizing that when the merits
of an evidentiary ruling are considered in a post-verdict hearing, the only policy concern is
whether the trial court had an adequate opportunity to fully review the claim).
Defense counsel's statement, "I noticed that when we were doing the jury selection
that the State struck all women . . . " (R209: 78), suggests that he was fully aware of the
suspect pattern of strikes during jury selection, but waited to raise his Batson claim until after
the remainder of the venire was excused. At that point, no prompt corrective action could
be taken, even if the trial court had found a violation. The only remedy was mistrial—or
given Batson *s automatic reversal rule, the possibility of reversal on appeal. See Carlston,
776 P.2d at 656 (recognizing that a delayed Batson objection allows a defendant to
"sandbag" the prosecution). See also McCrory, 82 F.3d at 1247 (recognizing that a delayed
Batson objection permits a defendant to "manipulate the system to the extreme prejudice of
the prosecution" by planting automatic reversal error).
In sum, defendant's Batsorfs objection was untimely and consideration of its merits
waived. This Court should reverse Part I of the Valdez opinion, vacate Parts II-IV of the
opinion as dicta, reinstate defendant's convictions, and remand to the court of appeals for
consideration only of defendant's remaining evidentiary claim (admission of B WS evidence).
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POINTII
VALDEZ FAILED TO APPLY THE BATSON STANDARDS AND
ANALYSIS ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT AND THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT
Should this Court conclude that defendant's Batson objection was untimely and
consideration of its merits waived, see Point I it should nevertheless clarify what constitutes
proper Batson analysis and standards and vacate Parts II-IV of the Valdez opinion. See
Span, 819 P.2d at 340 (clarifying Batson'§ "cognizable minority group" requirement, even
though the issue was not determinative of the outcome of the appeal). If defendant's
objection is timely and its merits fully reviewed, this Court should reverse Parts II-IV of the
Valdez opinion, affirm the trial court's finding of no discriminatory intent, and reinstate
defendant's convictions. In either case, the appeal should then be remanded to the court of
appeals for determination of defendant's remaining evidentiary claim (BWS evidence).
Valdez confuses and contradicts established Batson law. Valdez fails to consider the
merits of the trial court's ultimate finding of no discriminatory intent. See 2004 UT App
214, Tf 17 n.2. It also fails to apply established standards of review, impermissibly combines
distinct analytical steps, and erroneously equates a non-discriminatory explanation for a
peremptory strike with the bias requirement of a for-cause challenge. See id. at ^ 13, 17,
21-25 & 29. The flawed analysis in Valdez inevitably leads to its erroneous conclusion that
the trial court abused its discretion in not "outright" rejecting the prosecutor's explanations
for his strikes. See id. at ^ 30-31.
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A.

Batson's Incorporation of General Equal Protection Analysis.

Batson is based on "the general equal protection principle that the 'invidious quality'
of governmental action claimed to be [ ] discriminatory 'must ultimately be traced to a [ ]
discriminatory purpose.'" Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976)). Batson'§ three step analytical procedure is identical to that found in
employment discrimination cases. Compare Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-98, with Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-58 (1985) (cited with
approval in Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n. 18 & 98 n.20). Compare also Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ffi|
18-22, with University of Utah v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 736 P.2d 630, 634-65
(Utah 1987); aw/ Shekh v. Department of Public Safety, 90>4P.2d 110351105-1106 (Utah
App. 1995).
Consequently, in a Batson case, "[a]s in any equal protection case, the burden is, of
course, on the defendant who alleges discriminatory selection of the venire to prove the
existence of purposeful discrimination." Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. Defendant, as the party
alleging discrimination, must initially make a prima facie showing that the strike was made
for a discriminatory purpose (step one). This requires, as it does in any equal protection case,
that defendant show that "the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of
discriminatory purpose." Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94. See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54
"Once the defendant makes the requisite showing, the burden shifts to the State to
explain adequately" the strike (step two). Batson, 476 U.S. at 94. See also Burdine, 450
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U.S. at 253. More than a general denial is required: "[T]he State must demonstrate that
permissible [ ] neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic
result." Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55. If a neutral explanation is provided, the trial court must
evaluate the explanation and determine, based on the totality of the circumstances, if
defendant has carried his burden of establishing purposeful discrimination (step three).
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767. See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Accord J.E.B., 511 U.S. at
144.45; Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547.
Batson's analytical steps—and Valdez's errors in interpreting and applying them—are
more fully discussed below.
B.

Step One: The Prima Facie Showing.

Batson's first step requires the opponent of a peremptory strike (here defendant) to
make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised the strike with purposeful
discrimination. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 94

Step one's purpose is to eliminate "the most

common nondiscriminatory reasons" for a strike. See Burdine, 450 U. S. at 254. In other
words, the prima facie showing separates "meritless claims of discrimination from those that
have merit." Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 455 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
To establish a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, defendant must
demonstrate that the totality of the relevant facts surrounding the challenged strike gives rise
to an inference of discriminatory purpose. See Batson, A16 U.S. at 93-94; J.E.B., 511 U.S.
at 144-45; Colwell, 2000 UT 8, \ 18; Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 455. That is, if the facts alleged
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by defendant are believed, they are sufficient to support a finding that the strike was
exercised solely for a discriminatory purpose. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143; Batson, 476 U.S
at 89 & 98. See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. This requires "more than simply showing
that one or more minority jurors were peremptorily stricken." Harrison, 805 P.2d at 777.
Accord Colwell, 2000 UT 8 4 18; Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 457-58. Instead, the prima facie
showing must be based on "as complete a record as possible" and establish "a strong
likelihood" that discrimination occurred.3 See Alvarez, id.
Here, the sufficiency of defendant's prima facie showing is not at issue because the
prosecutor did not challenge it below (R209: 79-80). See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359;
Colwell, 2000 UT 8 4 18; Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547. See also Valdez, 2004 UT App
2 1 4 4 20. Nevertheless, Valdez commits err in its step one analysis.
Valdez fails to recognize that the weakness or strength of the prima facie showing,
even when not challenged in step one, remains relevant for step three. See 2004 UT App
2 1 4 4 20. In step three, the trial court must consider all relevant facts—including the
weakness or strength of the prima facie showing—in determining whether defendant has
carried his burden to prove that the strike was exercised solely for a discriminatory purpose.
See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369-70. See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56; University of
Utah, 736 P.2d at 6334-35.

3

In employment discrimination cases, the prima facie showing must be established
by a preponderance of the evidence. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53; University of
Utah, 736 P.2d at 635.
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Here, defendant's prima facie showing, though uncontested, was weak. Defendant
claimed only that the prosecutor used four of four (100%) peremptory strikes against women
(R209: 78). The figure is meaningless without context. See Colwell, 2000 UT 8, If 18;
Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 455-58; State v. Shepard, 1999 UT App 305,130, 989 P.2d 503.
The original venire originally consisted of 25 people, 14 of whom were women (14/25
or 56%). Three women were removed for cause—one over the objection of the prosecutor
(R. 94; R209: 66-69). The prosecutor used four peremptory challenges (4/4 or 100%) to
remove four of the remaining eleven women from the jury (4/11 or 36%) (id.). Defendant,
in turn, used four peremptory challenges (4/4 or 100%) to remove four of eight men (4/8 or
50%) (id.). The selected jury consisted of four men (50%) and four women (50%) (id.).
Consequently, though the prosecutor used 100% of his strikes against women, the strikes
only reduced the percentage of women jurors from 56% of the original venire to 50% of the
selected jury. This modest change in the overall composition of the jury does not alone
establish evidence of discriminatory intent. See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 777. See also 5 Crinu
Proc. at 326-27 (noting that a prima facie case is rarely established where the percentage of
jurors alleged to be improperly struck is less than the percentage of the group remaining on
the jury). But see State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 464 (Utah App.) (recognizing that "the
improper dismissal of even one venireman is intolerable"), cert denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah
1993).
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In sum, in this case, the prosecutor waived any objection to the sufficiency of the
primary showing. Nevertheless, the strength or weakness of defendant's prima facie showing
remains relevant to the ultimate Batson inquiry.
C.

Step Two: The Neutral Explanation.

Once a prima showing is made, the proponent of the strike (here the prosecutor) must
provide a facially neutral explanation for the challenged strike (step two). See Purkett, 514
U.S. at768;/.£'.£., 511 U.S. at 144-45; Batson, 476 U.S. at91-98;Higginbotham, 917P.2d
at 548. The explanation must raise a "genuine issue of fact" as to whether the challenged
strike was exercised with discriminatory intent. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. See also
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768-69. In this way, step two's explanation frames the factual issue
which will ultimately be resolved by the trial court in step three. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at
255.
Step two is purely a matter of production. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767. The
prosecutor must provide "an explanation based on something other that the race [or gender]
of a juror." Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. As with any peremptory strike, the reason should
be "related to [the prosecutor's] view concerning the outcome of the case to be tried."
Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. But because the explanation must create a "genuine issue of fact,"
a general denial of discriminatory purpose is insufficient. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
Instead, the prosecutor's "explanation of [his] legitimate reasons must be clear and
reasonably specific." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258 (quoted with approval in Batson, 476 U.S.
at 98 n.20, and Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768). In step two, however, the explanation need not be
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persuasive or even plausible. SeePurkett, 514 U.S. at 768; Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. Instead,
the credibility and validity of the explanation are the exclusive province of step three (the
trial court's ultimate determination), where
implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be
pretexts for purposeful discrimination. But to say that a trial judge may choose
to disbelieve a silly or superstitious reason at step three is quite different from
saying that a trial judge must terminate the inquiry at step two when the [ ]
neutral reason is silly or superstitions. The latter violates the principle that the
ultimate burden of persuasion regarding [discriminatory] motivation rests and
never shifts from the opponent of the strike.
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 (emphasis in original). Accord Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f 22;
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548. "Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the
prosecutor's explanation, the reason will be deemed [] neutral." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769.
"Placing this burden of production on [the prosecutor] thus serves simultaneously to
meet the [defendant's] prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and
to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the [defendant] will have a full and
fair oppor tunity to demonstrate pretext." Burdine, at 255.

Once a facially neutral

explanation is given, the burden shifts back to defendant to proved that the prosecutor's
reasons "were not [his] true reasons, but rather a pretext for discrimination." See University
of Utah, 736 P.2d at 635. This "allocation of burdens and the creation of a presumption by
the establishment of a prima facie case is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into
the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8.
AccordPurkett, 514 U.S. at 767-69.
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(1) Requirements for a Neutral Explanation.
Contrary to the authorities discussed above, Valdez holds that step two requires that
the prosecutor's explanation be "(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear and
reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate." See 2004 UT App 214, 1| 21 (quoting State v.
Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,T|9,41 P.3d 1153). The court of appeals erroneously treats these
components as factors to be weighed by the trial court, whereas they are simply general
descriptions of the type of explanation needed.4 Compare Valdez at ^| 21-25 & 27, with
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768-69, and Bur dine, 450 U.S. at 255-58. Indeed, Batson used the
terms "clear" and "legitimate," not as weighed factors, but simply to "refute the notion that
a prosecutor could satisfy his burden of production by merely denying that he had a
discriminatory motive or by merely affirming his good faith." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769.
In effect, Valdez impermissibly grafts step three factors onto step two. See discussion
of step three, infra. This is the very error condemned by the United States Supreme Court
in Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767-69, and Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-58, and by this Court in
University of Utah, 736 P.2d at 634-35. Both Courts made clear that in an equal protection
claim, the proponent of the challenged action "need only produce [ ] evidence which would
allow the [court] rationally to conclude that the [challenged] decision had not been motivated
by discriminatory animus." See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257. See also Hernandez, 500 U.S.
at 359 (recognizing that a "discriminatory purpose . . . implies that the decisionmaker
4

This error is not unique to Valdez, but occurs in other court of appeals decisions.
See, e.g., Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, f 9; State v. Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363, ^ 7, 58
P.3d 867, cert, denied, 67 P.3d 495 (Utah 2003).
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selected a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In other words, the prosecutor's burden of production in step two is satisfied if he "simply
explains what he has done or produces evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons"
for his strikes. SeeBurdine, 450 U.S. at 256-57 (in context of employment discrimination).
In Valdez, the court of appeals recognizes that the prosecutor's explanations are
facially neutral, but then rejects them because they are "hardly clear, concise, or reasonably
specific... [and] offered nothing more than vague and generic descriptions of the jurors that
anyone could concede are nondiscriminatory, but which do not appear to have anything to
do with the jurors themselves." 2004 UT App 214, ^ 27-29. As will be discussed, this
assessment is erroneous.
(2) The Neutrality of the Explanations in This Case.
Contrary to Valdez, the record establishes that the prosecutor's explanations were
reasonably specific, clear, and non-discriminatory. See 2004 UT App 214, Iff 26-29. They
were, therefore, adequate to meet step 2's burden of production.
The prosecutor struck Valerio based on her employment in a non-profit agency (R209:
14-16, 79). He struck Gonzalez based on her claimed prior knowledge of the case (R209:
18-19, 65-66, 79). He struck Morley because he believed that her job, like Valerio's, might
render her overly compassionate and because the next juror had experiences and training,
which the prosecutor preferred (R209: 27-30, 45-46, 79-80). None of the explanations
implicated gender and, consequently, none were inherently discriminatory. See, e.g.,
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Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 370; United States v. Moreno, 878 F.2d 817, 820 (5th Cir.), cert,
denied, 498 U.S. 924 (1999); Macial, 854 P.2d at 546-47; State v. Williams, 545 So.2d 651,
653-54 (La. App. 1989) (all upholding the neutrality of strikes based on a juror's appearance,
demeanor, reactions, or attitudes). See also J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142 n. 14 & 143 n. 16; United
States v. Johnson, 905 F.2d 222, 223 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 498 U.S. 979 (1989); United
States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 114 (1989) (all
upholding the neutrality of strikes based on a juror's employment, occupation, military
affiliation, or other associations). See 5 Crinu Procedure at 329-33 (main text) & at 94-95
(supp.).
The prosecutor struck Thornton based on her prior jury service and the presumptively
reduced verdict of manslaughter she had returned in that case (R209: 14, 34, 49-50, 79).
According to Valdez, the prosecutor's explanation is "unrelated to the case at hand." 2004
UT App 214, ^f 28. The court asserts that "manslaughter has nothing to do with the present
case" and that Thornton's participation in another criminal case "does not undermine her
ability to be impartial in the present case." Id. This misinterprets the requirement of
specificity in step two. Regardless of the nature of the cases involved, prior jury service is
a facially neutral and ultimately legitimate reason to strike a juror. See 5 Crinu Procedure
at 328-34. See also United States v. Contreras-Contreras, 83 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir.
1995). Additionally, the non-discriminatory explanation for a peremptory strike does not
need to "rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause." See Colwell, 2000 UT
8, K 22. See also Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768-89 (same).
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In sum, Valdez erred in rejecting the prosecutor's non-discriminatory explanations
"outright" and in failing to advance to step three of its Batson analysis.5
D.

Step Three: The Factual Finding of Discriminatory Intent.

Step three of Batson analysis requires the trial court to determine if defendant has
proven purposeful discrimination, i.e., that the prosecutor exercised the challenged strike
solely for a discriminatory reason. See Batson, 416 U.S. at 98; Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at
548. See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-58. In this final step, the trial court must determine
if the prosecutor's "explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed." See
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365. Even in step three, however, the issue is not whether the
explanation is in fact true, but whether the reason given for the strike is a pretext to disguise
an impermissible discriminatory motive.

See Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 549 n.3.

Consequently, even if the prosecutor is mistaken in fact in his explanation, defendant cannot
prevail in his Batson objection unless he establishes that the prosecutor's motive was in fact
discriminatory. See Higginbotham, id.

5

Valdez may erred in applying an abuse of discretion standard for steps one and
two. See 2004 UT App 214, ^ 14-17. Viewing the two steps as "reciprocals," the court
adopted the standard based on Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 456 (reviewing step one for abuse of
discretion). See 2004 UT App 214, ^ 15 & 17. The standard is questionable, however,
because a prima facie showing is normally treated as a question of law. See Bair v.
Axiom Design, 2001 UT 20, Tf 13, 20 P.3d 388. Similarly, whether an explanation is
inherently discriminatory is viewed as a question of law. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at
359; State v. Jensen, 2003 UT App 273, f 15, 76 P.3d 188.
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Only in step three does "the persuasiveness of the [prosecutor's] justification become
[ ] relevant." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. In step two, an implausible, but facially nondiscriminatory reasons is sufficient because the prosecutor bears no burden of persuasion.
Id. See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257-58. In step three, however, "implausible or fantastic
justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination."
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. AccordColwell, 2000 UT 8, \22; Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548.
In step three, the trial judge must "undertake a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Batson, 476 U.S. at 93.
The "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the exercise of the peremptory strikes should
also be considered. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363. Factors that may bear on the validity
and credibility of the explanation include: "(1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared by
the juror in question, (2) failure to examine the juror or perfunctory examination assuming
neither the trial court nor opposing counsel had questioned the juror, (3) singling the juror
out for special questioning designed to evoke a certain response, (4) the prosecutor's reason
is unrelated to the facts of the case, and (5) a challenge based on reasons equally applicable
to juror[s] who were not challenged." State v. Cantu, 788 P.2d 517, 518-19 (Utah 1989).
Often, however, the trial court's assessment may be based on "little evidence" other than the
credibility of the prosecutor. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.322,340 (2003) (reaffirming
that "[t]he credibility of the prosecutor's explanation goes to the heart of the equal protection
analysis [and] once that had been settled, there seems nothing left [for an appellate] court to
review").
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Valdez never reviewed the trial court's finding of no discriminatory intent (step three)
because it prematurely terminated its analysis with step two. See 2002 UT App 214, ^ 17 n.2.
If Valdezhad proceeded to step three, it would had been obligated to defer to the trial court's
ruling unless clearly erroneous. See Colwell, 2000 UT 8, \ 20. Here, the trial court's
ultimate finding of no discriminatory intent is fully supported by the record and,
consequently, entitled to affirmance on appeal.

See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369

(recognizing that "[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's
choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous") (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
By the time defendant made his Batson objection, the jury process was completed.
The stricken jurors had been excused and were no longer in the courtroom (R209:70,78-80).
The prosecutor and the trial court, therefore, had to rely primarily on their memories of the
venire and the voir dire examination. The prosecutor had some notes, but he found several
unreadable (R209: 80). Additionally, due to the delay, the prosecutor no longer remembered
every detail of the four jurors or their responses in voir dire (R209: 79-80).6 Nevertheless,
he clearly remembered his primary reasons for striking them. He struck Valerio because he
felt her employment might make her "overly compassionate." He struck Gonzalez because
he did not like the tone and manner of her responses regarding her knowledge of the case.

6

He could not remember Thornton's specific pretrial knowledge of the case
(R209: 79). He also did not remember that Morley was a Title-I teacher's aide in addition
to a piano teacher (R209: 80). He may have been confused about what magazines Morley
read (R209: 79).
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He struck Thornton because she had previously served on a jury, which had returned a
verdict of manslaughter. He struck Morley because he felt her employment, like Valerio's,
would make her more inclined to "let bygones be bygones;" he also preferred the next juror
who was a Vietnam veteran, hunter, and familiar with firearms. See R209: 79-80 (Add. D).
The prosecutor's reasons related to facts gleaned through voir dire. The reasons were
unique to the stricken jurors and did not apply to the seated jurors. None of the seated jurors
were employed by a nonprofit agency, taught school under a Title-I grant, or taught piano at
home as did stricken jurors Valerio and Morley. Only one member of the seated jury (Curtis)
had heard of the case (R. 94; R209: 34-35, 61-62). But unlike stricken juror Gonzalez who
related incorrect information, Curtis's information was correct. And unlike Gonzalez, who
only "thought" she could set aside outside information, Curtis viewed herself as a
"professional" and said she would "absolutely" judge the case only on the trial evidence
(R209: 60-61). None of the seated jurors had previously served on a jury and none had
rendered a reduced verdict in a criminal case, both of which Thornton had. See Add. E.
The trial court found the prosecutor's explanations reasonably specific, legitimate, and
credible (R209: 80). See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,787 n.6 (Utah 1991) (recognizing
facts implicit in the lower court's ruling). This finding was reasonable in light of the
weakness of defendant's prima facie showing, the detail and candor of the prosecutor's
explanations, the prosecutor's objection to the removal of one woman juror for cause (R209:
66-69), and the trial court's first-hand observations of the jurors and their responses in voir
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dire. It was reasonable in light of defendant's failure to challenge the prosecutor's stated
reasons for the strike.
Defendant's failure to attack the prosecutor's explanations below waives his right to
challenge the validity of those explanations for the first time on appeal. See Carlston, 776
P.2d at 655. Valdez disagrees and holds that defendant has no duty to "renew" his Batson
objection beyond his initial objection by further objecting once the prosecutor provided his
explanations for the strikes. See 2004 UT App 214, \ 13. This is incorrect. Once a neutral
explanation is tendered, defendant, as the party claiming discriminatory intent, bears the
burden of ultimately rebutting the explanation by disproving its validity. See Burdine, 450
U.S. at 255-56; University of Utah, 736 P.2d at 625. See also 5 Crim. Procedure at 329
(citing cases holding that a defendant must attack the prosecutor's explanation); State v.
Owen, 935 P.2d 183,196 (Idaho App. 1997) (reflisingto consider whether explanations were
pretextual where defendant did not attack them below).
Sound policy supports this requirement. Jury selection is subjective and the reasons
for striking a juror are highly personal. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,fflf20-21, 12
P.3d 92 (recognizing that jury selection "more art than science"). Yet, if&Batson objection
is successful in the trial court, it will result in the immediate reinstatement of the improperly
struck juror or the possible replacement of the entire venire. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99
n.24. Even when a party suspects an opponent's strike, he may opt not to raise a Batson
objection if he does not want the stricken juror to be reinstated or is otherwise satisfied with
the jury venire. See Litherland, id. Similarly, a party may initially raise a Batson obj ection,
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as defendant did here, but then choose to abandon it once the prosecutor provides obviously
neutral explanations for the strike. Id.
In this case, defendant's silence after the prosecutor explained the strikes reasonably
suggests his acceptance of the explanations' neutrality. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, f 13,
erred in considering defendant's challenge to those explanations for the first time on appeal.
See McCardel, 652 P.2d at 947 (recognizing that a failure to object below waives
consideration of the merits of an issue).
In sum, defendant failed to carry his burden of proving discriminatory intent and,
consequently, his Batson objection was properly denied by the trial court.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Valdez should be reversed, defendant's convictions should be
reinstated, and the case remanded to the court of appeals with directions to review only
defendant's remaining evidentiary claim concerning the admissibility of Battered Woman
Syndrome evidence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //<#bday of March, 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney GeneraT^^
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Assistant Attorney General
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E>
Court of Appeals of Utah
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v
Anthony James VALDEZ, Defendant and
Appellant
No 20030089-CA
June 24, 2004
Background
Defendant was convicted in the
District Court, Third District,
Salt Lake
Department, Judith S Atherton, J , of aggravated
burglary, possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person, and criminal mischief Defendant
appealed
Holdings The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J ,
held that
(1) defendant's alleged failure to timely present
Batson challenge did not prevent district court from
addressing challenge or result m waiver,
(2) defendant's objections to state's use of
peremptory challenges preserved Batson claim for
appeal, although he did not challenge validity of
prosecutor's explanations,
(3) Court of Appeals reviewed trial court's
determination for abuse of discretion, and
(4) prosecutor failed to articulate legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for using peremptory
challenges to strike only women
Reversed and remanded
West Headnotes
[1] Jury <&==> 117
230kll7
Defendant's alleged failure to timely present Batson
challenge by failing to raise it until after the venire
had been dismissed, the jury had been sworn in, and
the court preliminarily instructed the jury did not
prevent district court from addressing challenge or
result in waiver, rather, court impliedly found good
cause to allow challenge to state's peremptory
strikes beyond usual limits by ignormg state's
timeliness argument and requiring the parties to
proceed directly to arguments on the merits
U S C A Const Amend 14, Rules Cnm Proc ,
Rule 18(c)(2)
[2] Jury <®^ 117

230kll7
Under Batson, a challenge to a peremptory strike
must be timely U S C A Const Amend 14
[3] Criminal Law <@^> 1028
110kl028
Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion
are deemed waived, precluding the appellate court
from considering their merits on appeal
[4] Criminal Law <®^=> 1035(5)
110kl035(5)
What constitutes a timely challenge under Batson
depends entirely upon local procedures, but only
firmly established and regularly followed state
procedure may be interposed by a State to prevent
subsequent appellate review of the important
constitutional claim U S C A Const Amend 14
[5] Jury <§^>117
230kll7
A district court may consider a defendant's Batson
challenge beyond the dismissal of the venire, even if
it has made no specific finding of good cause, so
long as it allows counsel to proceed with their
Batson arguments, the district court impliedly finds
good cause to consider the constitutional claim
U S C A Const Amend 14, Rules Cnm Proc ,
Rule 18(c)(2)
[6] Criminal Law <3^=> 1035(5)
110kl035(5)
Court of Appeals could not prevent appellate review
of defendant's Batson claim due to lack of timeliness
even if court agreed that Batson challenges were
prohibited after the venire has been dismissed and
the jury has been sworn, as proposed rule was not
firmly established and regularly followed state
procedure
U S C A Const Amend 14, Rules
Cnm Proc , Rule 18(c)(2)
[7] Criminal Law <S^ 1035(5)
110kl035(5)
Defendant's objections to state's use of peremptory
challenges preserved Batson claim for appeal,
although he did not challenge the validity of the
prosecutor's explanations for the strikes U S C A
Const Amend 14
[8] Criminal Law <®=> 1030(1)
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110kl030(l)
To ensure the trial court's opportunity to consider an
issue, appellate review of criminal cases m Utah
requires that a contemporaneous objection or some
form of specific preservation of claims of error must
be made a part of the trial court record
[9] Criminal Law <@^> 1043(1)
110kl043(l)
In Utah, there is no clear rule requiring a defendant
to renew a Bats on objection or to object specifically
to the state's offered explanations, rather, Utah
courts do not require a party to continue to object
once a motion has been made, and the trial court has
rendered a decision on the issue U S C A
Const Amend 14
[10] Criminal Law <S^> 1152(2)
llOkl 152(2)
Court of Appeals considered defendant's Bats on
challenge one of discretion with the trial court and
reviewed trial court's determination for abuse of that
discretion, issue of whether the prosecutor offered a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for peremptoiy
strikes was less like a factual issue, because the trial
court did not weigh evidence, but instead looked to
the face of the state's explanations
USCA
Const Amend 14
[11] Jury <£=>33(5 15)
230k33(5 15)
The first step of the tripartite process for
determining whether the prosecution has engaged m
prohibited discrimination m the jury selection
process requires that a defendant challenging the
prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge present a
prima facie case of discrimination
[12] Criminal Law <&^> 1152(2)
llOkl 152(2)
A trial court's determination that a defendant has
presented a prima facie case of discrimination in
jury selection is a matter of some discretion on the
part of the trial court, and will only be reversed if
the trial court has abused its discretion
[13] Criminal Law <®^> 1152(2)
llOkl 152(2)
The Court of Appeals allows the trial court
discretion m making the determination whether, in
the context of the specific case, a defendant has
presented a prima facie case of discrimination in

jury selection
[14] Jury <®=>33(5 15)
230k33(5 15)
The third step of the tripartite process for
determining whether the prosecution engaged m
prohibited discrimination during the jury selection
process requires the trial court to weigh the evidence
and look beyond the explanation, if possible, to
determine whether the strike was purposefully
discriminatory
[15] Criminal Law <®^1158(3)
llOkl 158(3)
The trial court's actions in weighing the evidence
and looking beyond the explanation for a
peremptory strike during jury selection to determine
whether the strike was purposefully discriminatory
is intensely factual, and thus is reviewed for clear
error
[16] Jury <@^>33(5 15)
230k33(5 15)
Pursuant to Batson, Utah courts apply a three-step
test to determine whether the prosecutor has
engaged in prohibited disc nmmation during the jury
selection process, this test equally applies in cases of
gender discrimination U S C A Const Amend 14
[17] Jury <£==>33(5 15)
230k33(5 15)
Under the second step of the three-step test to
determine whether, pursuant to
Batson, the
prosecutor has engaged m prohibited discrimination
during the jury selection process, even suspect
explanations must be deemed facially valid unless
they are inherently discriminatory
U SCA
Const Amend 14
[18] Jury <®^>33(5 15)
230k33(5 15)
Although the Batson challenge step requiring the
prosecutor to give an explanation following a prima
facie case of discrimination does not demand an
explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible, it
does require the proponent of the peremptory
challenge to come forward with a neutral
explanation for the challenge
U SCA
Const Amend 14
[19] Jury <S^>33(5 15)
230k33(5 15)
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Under Bats on y the reason for a peremptory strike
must be related to the case being tried U S C A
Const Amend 14
[20] Jury ®^>33(5 15)
230k33(5 15)
Under Bats on, the reason for a peremptory strike
must be clear and reasonably specific U S C A
Const Amend 14
[21] Jury <S^33(5 15)
230k33(5 15)
Under Batson, a prosecutor is required to articulate
a neutral explanation related to the particular case,
giving a clear, concise and reasonably specific
legitimate explanation for excusing those jurors,
there must also be support m the record for such an
explanation U S C A Const Amend 14
[22] Jury <§^>33(5 15)
230k33(5 15)
Prosecutor
failed
to
articulate
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for using peremptory
challenges to strike only women, state did not
provide any basis for explanations that some jurors
were "overly compassionate" or "matter of fact,"
state cited vague nondiscriminatory motives without
tying motives to jurors themselves, and some of
state's explanations were unrelated to case at hand
U S C A Const Amend 14

the explanation will not be considered legitimate,
rather, the court reviewing a Batson challenge will
consider the explanation mere pretext as a matter of
law, unrelated as it is to the reality of the
proceedings before the district court
USCA
Const Amend 14
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OPINION
JACKSON, Judge
**1 Anthony James Valdez appeals convictions for
aggravated burglary, a first-degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-203
(2002), possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person, a second-degree felony, m
violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-10503(2)(a) (2002), and criminal mischief, a class B
misdemeanor, m violation of Utah Code Annotated
section 76-6-106 (2002) We reverse and remand

BACKGROUND

[24] Jury @^>33(5 15)
230k33(5 15)
If the prosecutor cites demeanor as a reason for
striking a juror, courts considering a Batson
challenge should apply particularly careful scrutiny,
because such after-the-fact rationalizations are
susceptible to abuse U S C A Const Amend 14

**2 Valdez was prosecuted for various domestic
violence charges, including the violent crimes listed
above
On October 29, 2002, the district court
conducted voir dire to select a jury for Valdez's
trial Following the jury selection, Valdez objected
to the State's use of its peremptory challenges under
Batson v Kentucky, 476 U S 79, 106 S Ct 1712,
90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986) In order to demonstrate a
prima facie case of discrimination under Batson,
Valdez s counsel noted that the State used all four of
its peremptory challenges to exclude women from
the jury Valdez further noted that in a domestic
violence jury trial, gender issues tend to be highly
charged
Ultimately, he argued, the State's
exclusion of only women from the jury cannot be
disregarded, on its face, in the context of this case

[25] Jury <£^33(5 15)
230k33(5 15)
Unless the neutral explanation offered by the state
for a peremptory strike may, on its face, be tied to
the issues, evidence, and context of the case at hand,

**3 The State did not argue that Valdez had failed
to present a prima facie case of discrimination, but
instead argued Valdez's Batson challenge was
untimely
Without addressing the timeliness of
Valdez's challenge, the district court ordered the

[23] Jury <£==>33(5 15)
230k33(5 15)
In order to survive a Batson challenge, it is not
enough for the prosecutor simply to describe a
nondiscriminatory motive without tying it to
something specific about the juror herself
U S C A Const Amend 14
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State to explain its challenges The State explained
its challenges as follows
[T]he State chose to strike Ms Valeno because
she stated that she worked for a nonprofit bram
injury type of place That is not a basis upon
which to strike her [for cause], but I felt her
responses lined up m a way that would make her
not a helpful [juror] for the State and that she
would be somewhat overly compassionate
The second [juror] was Ms Gonzalez She had
heard of the case and seemed— though she said
that it wouldn't bother her, her responses to me
seemed matter of fact and I felt like her responses
would not make her a good juror for the State
Ms Thornton had also heard of the case and I
don't recall what it was, there was something that
I immediately decided that I would make her one
of my strikes She'd also been on a jury and he
was found guilty of a manslaughter, which I
thought was probably a one-step reduction, at least
that's the assumption So again, I felt like she was
not going to be a helpful one for the State
The last one I agonized over whether to strike,
No 19, Paul[a] Morely or 21 Ron Hardy, I
conferred with my colleague,
*295 and we
talked about it and she brought to my attention he
was a hunter and that she felt like a hunter would
know things about guns and brought that point
about that potential juror and another one And
after conferring with her I changed my mind and
went with [her]-and that was simply—she was
simply towards the end I suppose there was also
it felt like she was not strong, not-I'm sorry, I'm
trying to read my notes here
There was this pattern of-her responses made me
think she would be somebody, again, that might be
willing to let bygones be bygones, what I would
say overly compassionate, and it was just based on
her responses about position, her responses to
little subtle things like her teaching piano lessons
and the magazines she chose We don't have a lot
to base these things on, so that's how I made those
choices
(First alteration m original)
Ultimately, the
district court accepted the State's explanations and
overruled Valdez's objection
**4 During the jury trial, the victim recanted her
accusation against Valdez
The State called an
expert m Battered Women Syndrom (BWS) to
explain why many victims of abuse recant their
accusation against their abuser Valdez objected to

the testimony, but the district court overruled the
objection
The jury found Valdez guilty of
aggravated burglary, possession of a dangerous
weapon by a restricted person, and criminal
mischief Valdez appeals
ANALYSIS
**5 Valdez challenges the district court's ruling
that the State offered nondiscriminatory reasons for
its use of peremptory stnfc es
I Procedural Issues
**6 As a preliminary matter, the State raises two
threshold procedural issues that, according to the
State, bar appellate review of Valdez's challenges
A Timeliness
[1][2][3][4] **7 First, the State contends Valdez
did not raise his Batson challenge in a timely
manner Under Batson, a challenge to a peremptory
strike must be timely See Batson v Kentucky, 476
U S 79, 99- 100, 106 S Ct 1712, 1724-25, 90
L Ed 2d 69 (1986) (allowing for local timeliness
rules to bar Batson challenges), Salt Lake County v
Carlston, 116 P 2d 653 655 (Utah Ct App 1989)
(stating, in context of Batson challenge, "[i]t is
axiomatic that, before a party may advance an issue
on appeal, the record must clearly show that it was
timely presented to the trial court m a manner
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon") "Issues not
raised in the trial court m timely fashion are deemed
waived, precluding this court from considering their
merits on appeal " Carlston, 776 P 2d at 655
What constitutes a timely challenge under Batson
depends entirely upon local procedures, see id,
Fordv Georgia, 498 U S 411, 423, 111 S Ct 850,
857, 112 L E d 2 d 935 (1991), but only " 'firmly
established and regularly followed state [procedure]'
may be interposed by a State to prevent subsequent
[appellate] review" of this important constitutional
claim Id at 423-24, 111 S Ct at 857 (citation
omitted)
**8 Valdez waited to raise his Batson challenge
until after the venire had been dismissed, the jury
had been sworn in, and the court preliminarily
instructed the jury The State refers us to several
other jurisdictions that require a Batson challenge to
be raised no later than "m the period between the
selection of the jurors and the administration of their
oaths " Id at 422, 111 S Ct at 857, see also
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Carlston, 116 P 2d at 655-56 (citing favorably, in
dicta, several jurisdictions that require Bats on
challenge to be raised prior to dismissing venire)
The reason for barring a Batson challenge after the
jury is sworn m has been variously stated as
follows
The "timely objection" rule is designed to prevent
defendants from "sandbagging" the prosecution by
waiting until trial has concluded unsatisfactorily
before insisting on an explanation for jury strikes
that by then the prosecutor may largely have
forgotten Furthermore, prosecutorial misconduct
is easily remedied prior to commencement of trial
simply by seating the wrongfully struck
venireperson
After trial, the only remedy is
setting aside the conviction
*296 Id at 656 (citations omitted), see also
People v Holder, 153 111 App 3d 884, 106 111 Dec
700, 506 N E 2 d 407, 408 (1987) (stating waiver
rule enforced "so as not to allow a defendant to
object to that which he has acquiesced m"
throughout trial)
**9 Furthermore, the State argues, this rule is
consistent with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
18(c)(2), which provides "[a] challenge to an
individual juror may be made only before the jury is
sworn
except the court may, for good cause,
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn but
before any of the evidence is presented " In State v
Harrison, the Utah Supreme Court applied rule 18's
good cause provision to review an untimely Batson
challenge
See 805 P 2d 769, 776 (Utah 1991)
However, m that case the challenge was "made and
argued immediately after the jury was sworn m,
before the challenged jurors were excused from
service, and before opening statements of counsel "
Id This is significant, the State maintains, because
once the venire and the challenged jurors have been
dismissed, the remedy of reinstating the wrongly
challenged juror is no longer available Thus, under
the State s argument, Harrison represents the
"outside limit" m Utah to timely raising a Batson
challenge
[5] **10 However, under Harrison, a district court
may consider a defendant's Batson challenge beyond
the dismissal of the venire, even if it has made no
specific finding of good cause pursuant to rule 18 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
See 805
P 2d at 776 So long as it "allow[s] counsel to
proceed with their [Batson ] arguments," the district

court impliedly finds good cause under rule 18 to
consider the constitutional claim Id In this case,
the district court did just that by ignoring the State's
timeliness argument and requiring the parties to
proceed directly to arguments on the merits Thus,
the district court impliedly found good cause under
rule 18 to allow a challenge to the State's
peremptory strikes beyond the usual limits
[6] **11 However, even if we adopted the State's
position, we could not "mterpose[ ]" it "to prevent
subsequent [appellate] review" m this case Ford,
498 U S at 424, 111 S Ct at 857 The rule the
State proposes, which would prohibit Batson
challenges after the venire has been dismissed and
the jury has been sworn, has not heretofore been a "
'firmly established and regularly followed state
[procedure] ' " Id at 423, 111 S Ct at 857 (1991)
(citations omitted)
At best, this rule could be
gleaned by analogy and implication from Harrison
and rule 18 However, rule 18 itself allows Batson
challenges at a later time than the State's proposed
rule, because it allows challenges "before any of the
evidence is presented " Utah R Cnm P 18(c)(2)
Thus, in the absence of any firmer and more
established authority on the subject, we could not
prevent appellate review of Valdez's constitutional
claim due to lack of timeliness [FN1]
FN1 This issue would best be addressed by an
amendment to the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure This opinion should not be read as a
comment, positive or negative, on the
appropriateness of the rule the State proposes
B Preservation
[7][8] **12 Second, the State argues Valdez failed
to preserve his objection to the State's explanation
for the strikes
Specifically, Valdez did not
challenge the validity of the prosecutor's
explanations for the strikes Consequently, the State
argues, Valdez is precluded from attacking the
State's explanations for the first time on appeal
' [T]o ensure the trial court's opportunity to consider
an issue, appellate review of criminal cases in Utah
requires 'that a contemporaneous objection or some
form of specific preservation of claims of error must
be made a part of the trial court record ' " State v
Brown, 856 P 2d 358, 360 (Utah App 1993)
(quoting State v Tillman, 750 P 2d 546, 551 (Utah
1987))
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[9] **13 We are persuaded by Valdez, however,
that his initial objection to the State's use of
peremptory challenges to strike women from the
jury constituted sufficient preservation of his
constitutional claim Ford v Georgia held that an
appellate court cannot prevent review by applying a
"rule unannounced at the time of petitioner's trial "
*297 498 U S 411, 424, 111 S Ct 850, 858, 112
L Ed 2d 935 (1991) In Utah, there is no clear rule
requiring a defendant to renew a Bats on objection or
to object specifically to the State's offered
explanations Rather, Utah courts do "not require a
party to continue to object once a motion has been
made, and the trial court has rendered a decision on
the issue " State v Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4,^ 14, 20
P 3d 265 Here, Valdez objected to the State's use
of peremptory challenges, thereby preventing any
claim that he strategically hid his objection until
after obtaining an unsatisfactory result, which seems
to be the State's strongest objection to Valdez's
challenge
II Issue and Standard of Review
[10] **14
Valdez specifically challenges the
district court's ruling that the State offered a
nondiscriminatory reason for its use of peremptory
strikes
We are unaware of any cases propeily
applying an appropriate standard of review for such
challenges State v Chatwin appears to set forth a
"clearly erroneous" standard of review for such
challenges See 2002 UT App 363,1) 5, 58 P 3d 867
"Chatwin argues that the prosecution's stated
reason for striking the potential juror was not neutral
and constituted illegal discrimination
Absent a
showing of clear error, we will not overturn a trial
court's determination concerning the discriminatory
intent embodied in a party's explanation for Ihe
exercise of a peremptory challenge "
Id To
establish the clearly erroneous standard of review m
the step two context, however, Chatwin cited,
without analysis, State v Cannon, 2002 UT App L8,
U 5, 41 P 3d 1153 That case set forth the clearly
erroneous standard of review in the step three
context, and is inapplicable here
Chatwin went
further, however, and decided the step two question
as a matter of law, rather than applying the clearly
erroneous standard it previously set forth
Here,
our decision will analyze and clarify the appropriate
standard of review for step two challenges
Accordingly, we must determine the appropriate
standard of review, relying on analogy to other
standards of review applicable in cases involving

alleged discrimination m the voir dire process
[11][12][13] **15 The challenge at issue involves
the second step of a tripartite process for
determining whether the prosecution has engaged in
prohibited discrimination in the jury selection
process See Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363 at ^j 7, 58
P 3d 867 The first step of that test requires that a
defendant challenging the prosecutor's use of a
peremptory challenge must present a prima facie
case of discrimination
See id
A trial court's
determination that a defendant has presented a prima
facie case of discrimination is a matter of some
discretion on the part of the trial court, and we will
only reverse that determination where the trial court
has abused its discretion See State v Alvarez, 872
P 2 d 450, 456 (Utah 1994)
The purpose for
allowing the trial court some discretion m
determining whether the defendant has presented a
prima facie case of discrimination was stated by the
Utah Supreme Court as follows
The abuse of discretion standard of review is
particularly appropriate to this question
[T]he
United States Supreme Court was reluctant to
define m detail what facts will raise an inference
of discrimination
Likewise, we have not
articulated specific factors that amount to a "strong
likelihood" that minority jurors were challenged
because of their iacial or ethnic group
membership By accoi ding discretion to the trial
court in this area, we permit "experience to
accumulate at the lowest court level" until we "see
more clearly what factors are important to [the]
decision and how to take them into account "
See id at 456 n 3 (citations omitted) What may
constitute a prima facie showing of discrimination in
the context of one case may not constitute a showing
of discrimination in the context of another case
This is so because each case may turn on different
issues, or even subtly different nuances Thus, we
allow the trial court discretion in making the
determination whether, m the context of the specific
case, a defendant has presented a prima facie case of
discrimination
[14] [15] **16 The third step of the tripartite
process for determining whether the *298
prosecution engaged m prohibited discrimination
during the jury selection process requires the trial
court to weigh the evidence and ' look beyond the
explanation, if possible, to determine whether the
strike was purposefully discriminatory " Chatwin,
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2002 UT App 363 at 1f 7, 58 P 3d 867 More than
being dependant on the particular issues,
circumstances and nuances of a particular case, this
determination requires the trial court to delve into a
weighing of the evidence and the credibility of the
prosecutor See Hernandez v New York, 500 U S
352, 365, 111 S Ct 1859, 1869, 114 L Ed 2d 395
(1991) This is an intensely factual determination,
see State v Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,11 13, 41 P 3d
1153, and we thus review the trial court's factual
findings for clear error See State v Jensen, 2003
UT App 273,H 7, 76 P 3d 188
**17 In our view, the issue involved here, whether
the
prosecutor
offered
a
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the peremptory strikes,
is closely analogous to the step one issue It seems
less like a factual issue because the trial court does
not weigh evidence, but instead looks to the face of
the State's explanations
See Chatwin, 2002 UT
App 363 at K 7, 58 P 3d 867 (stating prosecutor's
explanation "must be, at the very least, facially
neutral" (emphasis added))
The trial court's
examination of the facial neutrality of the State's
explanation also considers the general context of the
case and the specific issues mvolved, see id (stating
prosecutor's explanation "must be
related to the
case being tried"), similar to the way the trial court
considers whether the defendant has presented a
prima facie case of discrimination See Alvarez, 872
P 2d at 455-56
Indeed, the district court's
consideration of the context of the case is an
indispensable portion of the step two analytic
framework, as we will discuss below Thus, steps
one and two m the analytical process appear to be
analytic reciprocals Accordingly, it is appropriate
to consider this issue one of discretion with the trial
court and to review the trial court's determination
for abuse of that discretion [FN2]

+

*18

impermissible gender discrimination during the
selection of the jury In Batson v Kentucky, the
United States Supreme Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution governs the use of
peremptory challenges by prosecutors m criminal
trials
See 476 U S 79, 106 S Ct 1712, 90
L Ed 2d 69 (1986) In Batson, the United States
Supreme Court stated that although a defendant has
"no right to a 'petit jury composed m whole or m
part of persons of his own race,' " id at 85, 106
S Ct at 1717 (citation omitted), a "defendant does
have the right to be tried by a jury whose members
are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria "
Id at 85-86, 106 S Ct at 1717
In JEB
v.
Alabama, 511 U S 127, 114 S Ct 1419, 128
L Ed 2d 89 (1994), the United States Supreme
Court extended the holding of Batson to protect
litigants from gender discrimination m the jury
selection process
"We have recognized that
litigants
have an equal protection right to jury
selection procedures that are free from statesponsored group stereotypes rooted m, and
reflective of, historical prejudice
We hold that
gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for
juror competence and impartiality " Id at 128-29,
114 S C t at 1421
The litigants are harmed by the risk that the
prejudice that motivated the discriminatory
selection of the jury will infect the entire
proceedings

FN2 Because Valdez's step two challenge
constitutes a sufficient basis to reverse, we do not
reach his alternate step three argument Further,
we do not reach Valdez's arguments regarding the
admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome
evidence within the context of this case See State
v Heaton, 958 P 2d 911, 919 (Utah 1998)
(holding where one argument is dispositive of the
appeal, we need not address the defendant's
remaining arguments)

When state actors exercise peremptory challenges
m reliance on gender stereotypes, they ratify and
reinforce prejudicial views of the relative abilities
of men and women Because these stereotypes
have wreaked injustice in so many other spheres of
our country's public life, active discrimination by
litigants on the basis of gender during jury
selection "invites cynicism *299 respecting the
jury's neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the
law " The potential for cynicism is particularly
acute m cases where gender-related issues are
prominent, such as cases involving rape, sexual
harassment, or paternity Discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges may create the impression
that the judicial system has acquiesced m
suppressing full participation by one gender or that
the "deck has been stacked" m favor of one side
Id at 140, 114 S Ct at 1427 (citations omitted)

III Batson and its Progeny
Valdez claims the State engaged

[16] **19 Pursuant to Batson, Utah courts apply a
three-step test to determine whether the prosecutor

m
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has engaged m prohibited discrimination during the
jury selection process See State v Cantu, 778 P 2d
517, 518 (Utah 1989) (applying three-step test to
question of racial discrimination) This test equally
applies m cases of gender discrimination See State
v Jensen, 2003 UT App 273,K 13, 76 P 3d 188
(applying three-step test to question of gender
discrimination) We have stated the test as follows
M
[0]nce the opponent of a peremptory challenge
has made out a prima facie case of [gender]
discrimination (step 1), the burden of production
shifts to the proponent of the strike to come
forward with a [gender]-neutral explanation (step
2) If a [gender]-neutral explanation is tendered,
the trial court must then decide (step 3) whether
the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful
[gender] discrimination "
Id atU 13 (quoting State v Colwell, 2000 UT 8,1f
17, 994 P 2d 177 (other citation omitted))
(alterations m original)
**20 In the State's brief, it concedes that it waived
the issue of whether Valdez presented a prima facie
case of discrimination See Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at ^[
18, 994 P 2d 177 (stating prosecution must
challenge sufficiency of prima facie case before
providing rebuttal explanation for strike, or issue is
waived) Thus, we examme only step two of the
analysis
[17][18] **21 Under this step, even "suspect"
explanations must be deemed "facially valid" unless
they are "inherently discriminatory "
State v.
Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,H 10, 41 P 3d 1153, see
also Hernandez v New York, 500 U S 352, 360,
111 S C t 1859, 1866, 114 L Ed 2d 395 (1991)
("Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent m the
prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be
deemed [gender] neutral ")
Although this step
"does not demand an explanation that is persuasive,
or even plausible," Purkett v Elem, 514 U S 765,
767-68, 115 SCt 1769, 1771, 131 L Ed 2d 834
(1995), it does "require[ ] the proponent of the
peremptory challenge, the prosecutor m this case, to
come forward with a [gender]-neutral explanation
for the challenge " Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at ^ 17, 994
P 2d 177 Utah courts have enumerated a number
of factors that must be considered within the context
of the case at hand to determine whether the
prosecution has offered a legitimate explanation
The second step [of the analysis] requires "the
prosecutor to come forward with a race-neutral

explanation for the challenge " This step "does
not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or
even plausible " So long as the reasons given are
" '(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried,
(3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4)
legitimate/ " " 'the reason[s] offered will be
deemed race neutral ' "
Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at H 9, 41 P 3d 1153
(citations omitted)
**22 The courts have been instructive m defining
and applying each of these factors For example, m
Hidalgo v Fagen, Inc , the Tenth Circuit was asked
to decide whether a defendant's explanation for a
peremptory strike was facially neutral
See 206
F 3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cn 2000) In that case, the
defendant struck a Hispanic woman from the venire,
explaining that it was because of her youth See id
The court, looking specifically at the facial validity
of the defendant's explanation, concluded the strike
was neutral, holding "A neutral explanation means
an explanation based on something besides the race
of the juror
Unless discriminatory intent is
inherent in the justification, the reason offered will
be deemed race neutral " Id at 1019
Such a
rationale is similarly applied to show gender
neutrality
*300 **23 The " legit Lmate" factor is closely
related to the "neutral" factor As this court has
noted, the Supreme Court has provided guidance m
determining whether the reason for a peremptory
strike is legitimate " 'a "legitimate reason" is not a
reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not
deny equal protection ' " State v Merrill, 928 P 2d
401, 404 (Utah Ct App 1996) (citation omitted)
For example, m Merrill, the defendant claimed that
the reason the prosecutor gave for his peremptory
challenge was not legitimate
See id
The
prosecutor had dismissed a potential juror who was
Asian See id at 402 The reason for the dismissal,
the prosecutor explained, was because he feared the
potential juror would be biased against law
enforcement due to a recent speeding ticket See id
We concluded that was a legitimate explanation
because it "does not deny a potential juror equal
protection " Id at 404
[19] *M24 The reason for a peremptory strike must
also be related to the case being tried In State v
Cantu, a prosecutor's reason for a peremptory strike
of a Hispanic potential juror was invalidated m part
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because it was unrelated to the juror or the case
See 778 P 2d 517, 519 (Utah 1989)
The
prosecutor's proffered reason for the strike was
because he was angry with defense counsel See id
The Utah Supreme Court held that this explanation
was desultory, and thus insufficient to fulfill the
Batson requirement that peremptory strikes must be
based upon grounds reasonably related to the case at
bar See id.
[20] [21] **25 Finally, the reason for a peremptory
strike must be clear and reasonably specific This
factor prevents a prosecutor from merely denying
the existence of a discriminatory motive or by
generally proclaiming good faith, ensuring that
equal protection will not become a "vain and
illusory requirement " Batson v Kentucky, 476
U S 79, 98, 106 S Ct 1712, 1724, 90 L Ed 2d 69
(1986)
Rather, it requires the prosecutor "to
articulate a neutral explanation related to the
particular case, giving a clear, concise and
reasonably specific legitimate explanation for
excusing those jurors " New Mexico v Aragon, 109
N M 197, 784 P 2d 16, 21 (1989) There must
also be support in the record for such an
explanation See State v Macial, 854 P 2d 543,
547 (Utah Ct App 1993) For example, m Aragon,
the prosecutor struck two prospective jurors who
were black because they were possibly related to the
defendant See 784 P 2d at 17 The New Mexico
Supreme Court noted that nothing m the record
showed the prosecutor had any basis for his opinion
that the potential jurors might be untrustworthy,
other than his own statement of their possible blood
relationship See id As a result, the court ruled
that "[t]he prosecutor's explanation was hardly 'a
clear, concise, and reasonably specific explanation
for excusing those jurors ' " Id at 21 (citation
omitted) Accordingly, the court reversed the trial
court See id
IV Valdez's Batson Challenge
[22][23] **26 With that analytical framework in
mmd, we approach Valdez's step two challenge
Valdez's argument that the State's peremptory
challenges violated equal protection is persuasive
Specifically, Valdez argues that the State's reason
for using peremptory challenges to strike only
women was not reasonably clear or specific As m
Aragon, there is little in the record to demonstrate
that the State had any basis for its strikes of these
four women For example, as Valdez aptly notes,

the State explains that Jurors Morely and Valeno
were "overly compassionate" and Gonzalez was
"matter of fact" without providing any clear basis
for its opinions other than these cursory
descriptions
Further, the prosecutor stated
variously I felt her responses lined up in a way that
would make her not a helpful witness for the
State
[H]er responses to me seemed matter of
fact and I felt like her responses would not make her
a good juror for the State
I don't recall what it
was [about Ms Thornton], there was something that
I immediately decided that I would make her one of
my strikes " These explanations all fall short of
being reasonably clear and specific It is not enough
for the prosecutor simply to describe a
nondiscriminatory motive without tying it to
something specific about the juror herself
See
United States v *301 Horsley, 864 F 2d 1543, 1546
(11th Cir 1989) (holding prosecutor's explanation
that he struck juror because "I just got a feeling
about him" "obviously [fell] short" of being
reasonably clear and specific)
[24] **27 If the prosecutor cites demeanor as a
reason for striking a juror, courts should apply
"particularly careful scrutiny" because "such afterthe-fact rationalizations are susceptible to abuse "
Brown v Kelly, 973 F 2d 116, 121 (2nd Cir 1992)
Although not required, prosecutors "would be well
advised
to make contemporaneous notes as to the
specific behavior on the prospective juror's part that
renders such person unsuitable for service on a
particular case " Id In this case, however, the State
was hardly clear, concise, or reasonably specific in
its explanations It offered nothing more than vague
and generic descriptions of the jurors that anyone
would concede are nondiscriminatory, but which do
not appear to have anything to do with the jurors
themselves
This is not sufficient to satisfy our
equal protection jurisprudence, and is sufficient m
itself to reverse the trial court's treatment of the
State's peremptory strike
**28 In addition to not being reasonably clear and
specific, some of the State's explanations were
unrelated to the case at hand For example, the
State struck Thornton because she had been on a
jury that had found a defendant, who had been
charged with murder, guilty of manslaughter As
Valdez correctly notes, other than being a criminal
offense, manslaughter has nothing to do with the
present case
Valdez was not charged with
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manslaughter or any other lesser-included offenses
Furthermore, Thornton's participation on a jury that
convicted another defendant of manslaughter does
not undermine her ability to be impartial m the
present case
[25] **29 The State argues in its brief that these
explanations were not inherently discriminatory
because nothing m the explanations themselves
pointed directly to the sorts of invidious stereotypes
the law condemns While this may be true, the test
for determining the legitimacy and facial neutrality
of an explanation m the Batson context is the list of
factors outlined in Cannon, see 2002 UT App 18,If
9, 41 P 3d 1153, and analyzed above Unless the
neutral explanation offered by the State may, on its
face, be tied to the issues, evidence, and context of
the case at hand, the explanation will not be
considered legitimate Rather, we will consider the
explanation mere pretext as a matter of law,
unrelated as it is to the reality of the proceedings
before the district court
**30 Were we to hold otherwise, we would
sanction the use of fanciful and spurious
explanations
for
even
the
most
sinister
discriminatory motives Without the requirement
that the explanation at least have, on its face, a
grounding m the context of the case itself, racist or

sexist motives could more easily be masked by
unrelated
but
inherently
nondiscriminatory
explanations
In such a case, the district court
would have no need to proceed to step three to
plumb the depths of the prosecutor's motivations
because the State had offered nothing concrete by
way of explanation See State v Chatwin, 2002 UT
App 363,1) 20, 58 P 3d 867 (holding State did not
offer legitimate step two explanation, obviating the
need to proceed to step three) This is just such a
case The prosecutor's explanations had no clear
and specific basis m the case at hand Thus, we
hold it was an abuse of the district court's discretion
to
determine
the
explanations
were
nondiscriminatory and to proceed to step three
CONCLUSION
**31 The State's peremptory strikes should have
been invalidated by the trial court because the State
failed to offer facially legitimate, nondiscriminatory
explanations The explanations were neither clear
and specific nor related to the case being tried
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial
**32 WE CONCUR JUDITH M BILLINGS,
Presiding Judge and PAMELA T GREENWOOD,
Judge
END OF DOCUMENT
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo—
State of Utah,
Petitioner,
Case No. 20040633-SC

v.
Anthony James Valdez,
Respondent.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on August 2, 2004.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 4 5 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issues:
1. Whether a Batson challenge may be deemed timely if the
jury has been sworn and the remainder of the venire excused.
2. Whether the court of appeals applied the correct
criteria for a Batson analysis and the correct standard of review
on appeal.

THE COURT:

Date

/

Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice
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I hereby certify that on November 5, 2 004, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the party(ies) listed below:
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHRISTINE SOLTIS
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
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PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
LORI SEPPI
JOHN D O'CONNELL, JR
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
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and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand
delivered to a personal representative of the court(s) listed
below:
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COURT OF APPEALS
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 140230
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-023 0

Deputy 6ierk
Case No. 20040633-SC
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Addendum C

R U L E 18. SELECTION OF THE JURY
(a) The judge shall determine the method' of selecting' the jury and notify the
parties at a pretrial conference or otherwise prior to trial! The following procedures for,selection are .not exclusive.
(1) Sinke and Reptace Method. The court shall summon the number of the
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for any2
alternates, for all peremptory challenges permitted, and for all challenges for cause
granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in random order.
The judge may hear and determine challenges for cause during the course of
questioning or at the end thereof.- The judge^may and, at the request of any party,
shall hear and determine challenges for cause outside the hearing of the jurors.
After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to v fill the
vacancy, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges
for cause are completed^ the clerk shall provide a list of the jurors remaining, and
each side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory
challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all
peremptory challenges^ are ^exhausted[ or waived. _ The clerk shall then calj the
remaining jurors, or so many of them'as shall be^necessary to constitute the jury,
including any alternate jurors, and the persons whose names are so called shall
constitute the jury. If alternate jurors have been selected, the last jurors called
shall be the alternates, unless otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire.
, (2) Struck Method. The court SAhall summon the number of jurors that are to try
the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for any alternates, for all
peremptory challenges permitted and for all challenges for cause granted. At the
direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in random order. The judge mayL
hear and determine challenges for cause during the course of questioning or at the
end thereof. The judge may and, at the request of any party, shall hear, and
determine challenges for cause outside the hearing of the jurors. When the
challenges for cause^ aret completed, the clerk shall provide' a list of the jurors
remaining, and each side, "beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its
peremptory challenge to ;one juror at a time in regular^ turn until all peremptory
challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining jurors,
or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, including any
alternate jurors, and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the
jury/ If alternate jurors have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the
alternates, unless otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire.
(3) In courts using lists of prospective jurors generated in random order by
computer, the clerk may call the jurors in that random order.
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examination of
the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination.1 In the latter event,
the court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the examination by
such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit to the prospective
jurors additional questions" requested by counsel or the defendant. Prior to
examining the jurors, the court may make a preliminary statement of the case. The
court may permit the parties or their attorneys to make a preliminary statement of
the case, and notify the parties in advance of trial.
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror,
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or for the trial
of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection made to all jurors
summoned and may be taken by either party.
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from
the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, drawing, summoning and
return of the panel.

(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn and shall
be in writing or made upon the record. It shall specifically set forth the facts
constituting the grounds of the challenge,
(iii) If a ^challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a hearing may
be had to try any question of fact upon which the challenge is based. The jurors
challenged, and any other persons, may be called as witnesses at the hearing
thereon.
(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge tt> the panel is
allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial in question is
concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall direct the selection of jurors
to proceed.
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for cause. A
challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is sworn to try
the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after the juror
is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. In challenges for cause the
rules relating to challenges to a panel and hearings thereon shall apply. AH
challenges for cause shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense.
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason need be
given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory challenges. In other
felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor
cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges. If there is more than
one defendant the court may allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges
and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.
(e) A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and shall be heard
and determined by the court. The juror challenged and any other person may be
examined as a witness on the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for cause may
be taken on one or more of the following grounds. On its own motion the court may
remove a juror upon the same grounds.
(1) Want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law.
(2) Any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of performing
the duties of a juror.
(3) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged to be
injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted.
f (4) The existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship
between the prospective juror and any party^ witness or person alleged to have beer?
victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed objectively*,
would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be unable or
unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of favoritism. ^A prospective juror
shall not be disqualified solely because, the juror is indebted to or employed by the
state or a political subdivision thereof.,
(5) Having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil action, or
having complained against or having been accused by the defendant in a criminal
prosecution.
(6) Having served on the grand jury which found tfie indictment.
(7) Having served on a trial jury which has tried another'person for the particular
offense charged
(8) Having teen one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, and whose
verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict after the case was
submitted tp it:
(9) Havir~ berved as a juror in a civil action brought against the detendant for
the act charged as an offense, nr
(10) If the'offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of opinions
about the, death penalty as would preclude the juror from voting to impose the death
penalty followingconviction or would require the juror to impose the death penalty
following conviction regardlesp of the facts.

(ID TWansp the inrnf* iVnr! within one j e a r preceding, has been engaged or
interested in tarrying^ on any business, calling^or employment, Jhe carrying on o$
which is a' violation, of law, where., defendant is charged with a like offense."
(12) Because the juror has been a witness, either for or against the defendant on
tKe preliminary examination or before the grand jury.*"
\l3) Having £ormed*or' expressed ,an unqualified opinion or belief as to whether
the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged.
U4) Conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that reasonably
lead the court to conclude the juror is not hkely to act impartially.' No person may
serve as a juror, if challenged, unless the judge ^convinced the juror can and will
act impartially and fairly.
\f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and tnen oy uie
defense alternately*- Challenges for cause shall be completed before Deremntorv
challenges are taken."
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impaneled Alternate jurors, in
the order m which they'are called,} shall replace jurorsfwho, prior tq^the time the
jury retires to'cohsider its verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform their
duties. xThe prosecution and jlefense shall each have one additional peremptory
challenge for each alternate juror to be chosen. Alternate jurors shall be selected
k at the same time and in the same manner, shall have the' same qualifications, shall
"be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take the same oath and
shall have the same functions, powers, and privileges as principal jurors. Except in
bifurcated proceedings, an alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror
shall be discharged when the jury retires to consider its verdict/ The identity of the
alternate jurors may be withheld until the jurors begin deliberations,
(h) When the jury is selected an'oath shall be administered to the jurors, in
substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in issue
between the parties, and render a true ^eHicf according to the evidence and the
instructions of the court.

JURY & WITNESS ACT

§ 78-46-16
Note 1

§ 7 8 - 4 6 - 1 6 , Jury not selected in conformity with chapter—Procedure to
challenge—Relief available—Exclusive remedy
i

(1) Within seven days after the moving party discovered, or by the exercise of
diligence could have discovered the grounds therefore, and in any event before
the trial jury is sworn to try the case, a party may move to stay the proceedings
or to quash an indictment, or for other appropriate relief, on the ground of
substantial failure to comply with this act l in selecting h grand or trial jury.
(2) Upon motion filed under this section containing a sworn statement of acts
which if true would constitute a substantial failure to comply with this act, the
moving party may present testimony of the county clerk, the clerk of the court,
any relevant records and papers not public or otherwise available used by the
jury commission or the clerk, and any other relevant evidence. If the court
determines that in selecting either a grand or a trial jury there has been a
substantial failure to comply with this act and it appears that actual and
substantial injustice and prejudice has resulted or will result to a party in
consequence of the failure, the court shall stay the "proceedings pending the
selection of the jury in conformity with this act, quash an indictment, or grant
other appropriate relief.
(3) The procedures prescribed by this section are the exclusive means by
which a person accused of a crime, the state, or 'a party in a civil case may
challenge a jury on the ground that the jury was not selected in conformity with
this act.
Laws 1979, c. 130, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 153, § 25i<
1

Laws 1979, c 130 that enacted this chapter.

Addendum D

THE COURT:

All right.

MS. THORNTON:

Thank you.

My name is Tamara Thornton.

I work at

Thornton Plumbing and Heating, I've worked there about 20 years
and I do payroll and benefits.

Two years of college.

My

husband's name is Clay and he is an owner at Thornton Plumbing
and Heating.

We have three children, 20, 17 and 13.

Deseret

News comes to our home and Popular Science and such like that.
Hobbies, I enjoy reading and take Irish folk dancing
classes, things like that.
THE COURT:

Are you in a group9

MS, THORNTON:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Is it like river dance?

MS. THORNTON:

It's like river dance but I'm just a

beginner, so I'm not going to do any demonstrations.
THE COURT:

That was my next question.

And your

fanly company, how big is it 9
MS. THORNTON:

We have 58 employees.

It's a

third-generation company.
THE COURT:

So does it do subcontracting, is it in a

building?
MS. THORNTON:

Yes, we are usually a subcontractor

doing plumbing, radiant heating, HVAC, snow melting.

That's

kind of our specialty, the radiant -THE COURT:
MS. VALERIO:

Okay.

Thanks.

My name is Lynda Valerio.

I'm an
14

office manager for a nonprofit agency called the Burn Injury
Association of Utah.

I also train individuals with sustained

orain injuries to return to employment.
I have a high school education with some trade
schooling classes that I've taken.

My husband's name is Chris.

He is a customer service representative with a cell phone
company here in Salt Lake.

We have two children, one will be

five in two weeks and a daughter that is 16 months old.

My

husband gets Sports Illustrated and that's the only magazine or
newspaper we get.

Hobbies, I enjoy camping and any outdoor

activities, any crafts, ceramics and things like that.
THE COURT:
chat you work for.

Tell me a little bit about this nonprofit
Is it totally private donations or are you

able to get any federal funding for that?
MS, VALERIO:

We apply for grants so that we can

provide services for these individuals but we are the only
agency brain injury association m

the state of Utah, so ,e

serve the whole state for resources and -THE COURT:

Do you also work on issues such as

housing and that?
MS. VALERIO:

We do.

If an individual is in need of

housing, medical assistance, anything like that, we do refer
them out to professionals that can help them with that.
THE COURT:
support0

Do you also set up sort of a continuous

It seems that the issue of housing and being able to
15

function on a day-to-day basis is a very real issue.
MS. VALERIO:

Yeah, we help them to get connected

TA_cn independent living skills, we also help with doing that
training.
THE COURT: Thanks.
MS. CURTIS:

My name is Peggy Curtis.

substitute teacher for over 32 years.
Granite School District.

I was a

I worked mainly in the

I have both elementary and secondary

certificates, which of course I have the bachelor's degree but
some post education.

I have temporarily retired from that. My

husband is Alan, and he has retired from Questar Gas, which is
Mountain Fuel.

We retired just about a couple years ago, so it

may not be a permanent retirement, we may be going back to
work.
We have two children, I have a son that's 32 and then
I had another son who we lost to a sudden onset of cancer three
years ago, and he was 2 6 at the time.

I also have a grandbaby,

she'll be a year old next month, our pride and joy.
We subscribe to the Tribune and read it quite
regularly.

My husband also takes Outdoor Life. We own a home

in Beaver Dam, Arizona, which is between St. George and
Mesquite on 1-15 and we spend some of our winter times down
there.
summer

So we enjoy gardening down there and up here in the
Down there it's too hot.

And we have a motor home

and -16

THE COURT:
was

Where is this town?

I didn't think there

anything on that little strip.
MS. CURTIS:

It's in the Arizona strip.

It's 8 miles

north of Mesquite, 26 miles south of St. George and it is in v
what they call the Arizona strip.

Littlefield is what you'll

sometimes see on the off ramp of 1-15.

It's a retirement

community and it's maybe, I don't know, a thousand people. A
lot of them will leave in the summer, you know, when it's too
hot and go back up, kind of like snowbirds.
THE COURT:

Is it east or west of 1-15?

MS. CURTIS:

Some people will say north or south,

depending how the road goes.
right.

As you're going south it's on the

And actually there's two towns, Littlefield is on the

left of the freeway as you're going south and Beaver Dam is on
the right.
towns.

They've combined them, they're not incorporated

So, you know, there is an elementary school, it's

growing quite rapidly down there with some regular full
families moving in a lot now too, but we just have a summer
home.
THE COURT:

Do they commute?

MS. CURTIS:

A lot of them in Mesquite and some in

St. George.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. ROBERTS:

Thank you.

My name is Christine Roberts.

at Bausch & Lomb assembling medical devices.

I work

High school
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education.
IS,

I'm divorced.

I have three children, three boys,

14 and 11. They keep me quite busy.

Right now we don't

subscribe to any magazines or newspapers other than the TV
guide.

And hobbies, my boys' sports and we're actively

involved in our Catholic church, we do a lot of things to help
out people and stuff.

And that's about it.

THE COURT:

I thought Bausch & Lomb is -- doesn't

that make lenses?
MS. ROBERTS: Yes.
THE COURT:

Is that what you do?

MS. ROBERTS:

No, we actually produce an orb scan

ic's called, and it scans your eyes, the posterior and exterior
of your eyes and it's a -- right on the temple.
THE COURT:

Is that to check for --

MS. ROBERTS:

It measures the posterior and exterior

of your eye to find anything wrong with your eyes.
THE COURT:

Like astigmatism or something like that?

MS. ROBERTS:
THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

Uh-huh.

So the actual manufacturing facility is

right here in Salt Lake?
MS. ROBERTS:

Yes, it's here.

There's about 3 5 or 4 0

employees there.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. GONZALEZ:

All right. Thanks.

My name is Joyce Gonzalez and I'm

trying to retire as housekeeping.

And I have a high school
18

1
2
3

level education.
from Hercules.

And my spouse's name is Jessie and he retired

And I have three children, 45, 43 and 41, a

daughter and two sons.

4 magazines.

And we take the Tribune and just craft

And my hobbies, we have a cabin at Scofield

5 Reservoir that takes up a lot of our time in the summer, and my
6 grandchildren.
7

THE COURT:

How many grandchildren do you have?

8

MS. GONZALEZ: Four.

9

THE COURT:

Now, what are you trying to retire from?

MS. GONZALEZ:

10

Well, I clean houses for my children

11 and they don't want me to quit.

I'm ready to quit.

So I'm

12 trying to quit.
13

THE COURT:

Good luck. Thanks.

14

MS. UNGVICHIAN:

My name is Jennifer Ungvichian.

I'm

15 a full-time student up at the university and an office manager
16 for Spiral Productions and Higher Ground Learning.
17 sophomore up at the University.
18 any kids.
19 house.

I am a

I'm not married and don't have

We don't take any magazines or newspapers at our

And when I'm not working or going to school I'm

20 studying or I do yoga and volunteer at the Road Home. That's
21

it.

22

THE COURT:

23

MS. UNGVICHIAN:

24

THE COURT:

What are you studying at the U?
I'm a mass communications major.

Do you want to -- are you planning on

25 using that degree?
19

THE COURT:

What service9

MR. MOISION :

I retired out of the International

G^rd.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Do you have any patents or do you

chink you '11 (jet any?
MR, MENKE:

I've got one I'm working on.

THE COURT:

All right.

MS. MORLEY:
:.re

home.

Thanks.

My name is Paula Morely.

I work part

for .Jordan School District and I give piano lessons in my
I have a college degree, a bachelor's.

My spouse's name

^s Russell, his is a store manager for the Deseret Book Company.
We have f lve children, one of whom is deceased.

The others are

23, 20, 16 and 14 years old.
We t:ake the Readers Digest and the Deseret News at
our home and iSports Illustrated for the boys.

My hobbies

include music , baking, outdoors things with my family, camping
and going to football games and things.
THE COURT:
MS. MORLEY:
THE COURT:
MS. MORLEY:
THE COURT:

Utah, BYU?
BYU.
That's okay to say that in Salt Lake.
One's as bad as the other.
What do you do at the Jordan School

^strict 9
MS. MORLEY:

Title one aide in an elementary school.

I work in the computer lab.
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THE COURT:

What does title one mean?

Is it a

designation?
MS, MORLEY:

It's a federal program to help boost the

reading and math levels.
THE COURT:

Is it sort of a resource --

MS. MORLEY: Yes.
THE COURT:

-- position?

MS. MORLEY: Yes.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. PAULSEN:

Thank you.

My name is Jeff Paulsen.

I'm a

full-time student, a photographer for the daily Utah Chronicle.
I'm working on my undergraduate degree in urban planning.
wife's name is Jennifer.

My

She is the campaign coordinator for

cne Leukemia Lymphoma Society.

Two spoiled dogs, so many

magazines I wouldn't even want to go there.
THE COURT:
MR. PACE:

They're not illegal publications; right?
Oh, no.

We just get a lot of door to door

in the Avenues, and probably every neighborhood, but they just
pile up.

Hobbies, leisure activities, anything that involves

adrenaline and gear I'm pretty much a sucker for.
THE COURT:
degree?

Okay.

Where is the urban planning

What department is that in, is it in -MR, PAULSEN:
THE COURT:

It's in the geography department.
Is there an overlapping with

architecture?
28

And, Mr. O'Connell, I'm going to ask you to do the
same thing, introduce yourself and your client, any witnesses
you may call.
MR. O'CONNELL:

My name is John O'Connell, Jr., I got

my JD degree and I represent Anthony James Valdez.
to stand up?

Do you want

And other than the State's witnesses -- we may

call other witnesses if they don't, but that's all the
witnesses we have.
THE COURT:
Mr. Valdez?

Do either of you know Mr. O'Connell or

If so, please raise your hand.

All right. No

hands have been raised.
Have any of you heard or read anything about this
case?

If so, please raise your hand.

All right.

Yeah, Ms. Thornton.
MS. THORNTON:

I believe I heard about it on the news

months ago.
THE COURT:

Do you have any specific recollection of

this case?
MS. THORNTON:
THE COURT:

Not specific, no.

And just answering yes or no, is there

anything about your knowledge that you believe would affect
your ability to be an impartial juror in this case?
MS. THORNTON:
THE COURT:
MS. CURTIS:

No.

Yes, Ms. Curtis.
I believe I also remember just reading
34

generally about it, but nothing specific.
THE COURT:

Any impressions that you feel would

affect your ability to serve as a juror in this case?
MS. CURTIS:

I hope not, I don't think so.

THE COURT:

No further hands have been raised.

MS. GONZALEZ:
THE COURT:

Oops.

I recall seeing it on the news and --

Okay.

Do you believe that having heard

something about this would interfere with your ability to serve
as a juror in this case9
MS. GONZALEZ:
THE COURT:

I don't think so.

I see. Yes.

MS. WEIGHT:

I just remember reading generally about

it as well.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Anything about wnat you heard that

you believe would interfere with your ability to serve as a
juror in this case?
MS. WEIGHT:

I -- well, I probably should admit to

the court after being married to a cop for almost 20 years I
have some issues, yes.
THE COURT:

You know, we may talk to you m chambers

after a while about that.

There will be further questions with

regard to law enforcement issues too.
All right.

Anyone else9

All right.

Let me explain

to you a little bit about the function of the various parties
in -- partici]pants in the case.
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THE COURT:
it's a civil case.

Okay.

So it was a civil -- you indicated

Did you serve as like an expert witness or

anything like that --MR. JACOBSON:
THE COURT:

Yes.

As part of your professional expertise?

MR, JACOBSON:
THE COURT:

Correct.

And you actual did testify at trial?

MR. JACOBSON:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Anything about that: experience you

believe> would affect your ability to be an impartial juror in
this case?
MR. JACOBSON:
THE COURT:

No.

Mr. Paulsen?

MR. PAULSEN:

I was a witness as well as a plaintiff

in the civil and criminal trials.
THE COURT:

The criminal trial was the one that you

were involved in and the civil -MR. PAULSEN:
THE COURT:

Same.
Same circumstance, okay, all right.

Okay.
Anyone else?
Have any of you ever served on a jury before?
please raise your hands.
Ms. Thornton, do you recall if it was -MS. THORNTON:

Criminal.
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If so,

THE COURT:

How long ago was that?

MS. THORNTON:
THE COURT:

Eight years ago.

Do you recall whether the jury was able

to reach a verdict?
MS. THORNTON:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Do you recall what that was?

MS. THORNTON:

Yeah, he was found guilty of

manslaughter.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Anything about that experience you

believe would affect your ability to serve on this jury?
MS. THORNTON:
THE COURT:
Okay.

No.

Okay.

Others?

Ms. Zingleman, civil or criminal?

MS. ZINGLEMAN:
THE COURT:

Two criminal.

How long ago?

MS. ZINGLEMAN:

One was about four years ago and one

was about 17.
THE COURT:

You're just lucky.

Some people haven't

even been called before probably.
Were the juries able to reach verdicts in those
cases?
MS. ZINGLEMAN:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Do you recall what they were?

MS. ZINGLEMAN:

They were both guilty.

One was a

disorderly drunken driving and the other was convicted of rape.
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follow the instructions then it creates a problem, but Mr. Pace
said that he couldn't give police the same weight as any other
witness simply because of the police status, and he also
responded that his friend had been charged and he didn't like
the way that turned out and, therefore, that would influence
m s decision.
MR. O'CONNELL:

Also don't know what he means by

that, he may give cops more weight.

He actually works in I

would say a law enforcement capacity, that's what I first
thought when he said that, and if that's the case that's
something I don't know that the State really can object to.
THE COURT:

I find an entirely different situation

from victims and find that he indicated that he could not
follow my instruction as to the law and that's an appropriate
for-cause challenge.

Okay.

We're going to need to see these five, and I did them
out of order.

The first one is Ms. Stavros and I have four

for-causes, Pace, Weight, Paulsen and Bass at this point.
MR. O'CONNELL: Yes.
THE COURT:

Hi, come on in.

The attorneys are -- or

at least one -- well, maybe both attorneys have just a couple
follow-up questions.
Mr. O'Connell?
MR. O'CONNELL:

Yeah, you mentioned that I guess you

were a victim of abuse in a marriage?
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MS. STAVROS:

Uh-huh.

MR. O'CONNELL:

Can you tell me more about -- was

that something that happened early in the marriage?
you were married for quite a long period of time.

You said
Or was that

what ended the marriage?
MS. STAVROS:

Actually, it didn't happen until the

end, you know, close to the end of the marriage, and it was
just a -- it was actually more emotional abuse than really
physical abuse.

And it was just a combination of situations

and everything and, you know, I -- it wasn't something that,
you know, I harbor any feelings about.
THE COURT:

And you've been divorced for ten years

now, did you say?
MS. STAVROS:
THE COURT:

Twenty-three.

Yeah, you've actually been divorced for

2 3 years.
MS. STAVROS:

Uh-huh.

MR. O'CONNELL:

Also I wanted to ask you, you said

that you -- also that your son was assaulted and you went to
crial on it.
MS. STAVROS:

Yeah.

MR. O'CONNELL:

You said you tried to blank it out.

Why is that?
MS. STAVROS:

Just because it's been a very hard

situation to deal with as far as he was going to be a
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veterinarian and he can t do that because he has a shake now

and there's - -it's created, you know, some situations in his
life that wou ldn*t have been there if the assault didn't occur.
' And it's just , you know, I've just tried to not look at that
part of it and just tried to look at all the positive things,

you know, not dwell on what happened.
MR. O'CONNELL:

Okay.

And you said you went to trial

on that?

MS. STAVROS:
MR. O'CONNELL:
MS. STAVROS:

Uh-huh.
And it was a criminal case?
Yeah.

I did not have to testify.

And

the reason we never took it to a jury trial is because the
doct ors felt like it would be too traumatic for my son to have
to relive it 1because it had been a whole year and he was making
major progress in his battle to overcome some of the problems
that he had.

MR. O'CONNELL:
MS. STAVROS:

So how did it resolve?
The one person that did the actual

beat ing with a baseball bat did go to jail.

MR. O'CONNELL:
MS. STAVROS:
MR. O'CONNELL:

So he pled to something, I take it?
What?
There was some sort of plea bargain

that they did that you didn't take it to trial?

MS. STAVROS:

We just didn't want to go to trial

because it was something that the psychologists did not think
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my son could live through again.
MR. 0 ' CONNELL: How did you feel about all that, how
it resolved?
You know, no one can ever go back

MS. STAVROS:

and -- I mean no matter what happened, you can't erase what
did -MR. 0»CONNELL:

What about how it resolved with the

plea bargain and -- was that okay with you or do you feel that
it would have been better if something could have been more -coulci have be en done?
MS. STAVROS:

That's a hard question to answer.

I

feel like justice was done, you know, I feel like justice was
done
MR. 0fCONNELL:

And knowing that this is a criminal

case and also involves an assault, do you think that that
experience wi 11 affect your ability to be -MS. STAVROS:

I hope it wouldn't because, you know,

every aspect is different

You hope but you're not sure?

MR. 0'CONNELL:

I m not positive really, you know.

MS. STAVROS:
not positive.

every situation is different.

But I feel like I'm really a pretty

objectionable person that I would look at everything.
MR. O1CONNELL:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Burmester, any questions?

MR. BURMESTER:

No.
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I'm

THE COURT:

All right.

MS. STAVROS:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Hi

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Thanks, Ms. Stavros.

Hi.

Just a follow-up question or two.

I'm

going to let ^he -- this is Ms. Tamara Thornton.
Mr. O'Connell9
MR. O'CONNELL:

You said that you were a victim of

domestic violence?
MS. THORNTON:
THE COURT:

No, I never said that.

No , she said she'd heard something about

the case
MR. O'CONNELL:
MS. THORNTON:
MR, O'CONNELL:
about th:LS on the news.
MS. THORNTON:

I'm sorry.
Then I was a juror.
Let me ask -- you said you heard
What do you remember hearing9
I don't have a real strong memory of

it, I just vaguely remember the name seemed familiar and that
there was an .individual broke into a home, and I just really
don' t remember a lot about it.
MR, O'CONNELL:

Okay.

Are you sure that this case

was the cDne you're think m g about in the news or are you

Must •-MS. THORNTON:
MR. O'CONNELL:

I guess I'm not 100 percent sure.
And other t:han that, you heard an
58

individual had broken into a home, do you remember anything
else about it?
Yeah, no.

MS. THORNTON:
THE COURT:

Mr. Burmester, questions?

MR. BURMESTER:
THE COURT:

No.

You indicated earlier that you would be

able to set aside any of that.

Do you feel at this point you

would have any problem with weighing only the matters you hear
in court?
MS. THORNTON:
THE COURT:

No.

The evidence?

MS. THORNTON:

No.

MR. O'CONNELL:

One other question:

Was it in the

newspaper or on TV?
MS. THORNTON:
THE COURT:

It was on TV.

All right.

MR. OfCONNELL:
THE COURT:

Thanks, Ms. Thornton.

It's Curtis, right?

Is this Ms. Curtis?

THE BAILIFF: Yes.
THE COURT: Hi.
MS. CURTIS: Hello.
THE COURT:

Just a couple of follow-up questions.

I'm going to let the attorneys ask any -MS. CURTIS:

Then I did have something to say.

I was

thinking about it after you left and as a child I was a victim
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of sex abuse.

It was back in those days it was something that

was not done.

It was nothing severe, it never went -- it was

in the family, it was my father, but it has never been -- I
::.ean nobody knows it except my psychiatrist and -- you know,
but it's something that has been in the past and has never -you know, it was never brought up.
Then there was also when I was about 15 babysitting
there was -- like I said, the sex abuse was not -- there was no
rape, it was more molestation, and babysitting I also was
subjected to some unwanted touching and things when I was a
teenager.

And I went home at that time and told my father

about it and he, a military man, was very -- I'll take care of
this and had me scared to death, but he has never acknowledged
anything that he had ever done.

Prior to this day we still

haven't, but I didn't -- in fact, it just hit me.
THE COURT:

That's fine to do this in a little bit

more comfortable, less public forum.
With regard to those issues, they happened when you
were -- both of the times when you were still a child?
MS. CURTIS: Very young, yes, correct.
THE COURT:

Do you believe that that would interfere

with your ability to weigh the facts in this case?
MS. CURTIS: No, absolutely not.

I consider myself

very professional that I would not do that. But I did want to
let you know.
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THE COURT:

I appreciate that.

Mr. O'Connell?

I think Ms. Curtis indicated she may

have heard something about this case.
MR. OfCONNELL:

You said you may have heard this case

in the news?
MS. CURTIS:

Right.

Like I said, I read the

newspaper quite thoroughly but, again, I don't remember
details.

I do remember -- in my mind when you were reading

over the charges it seemed in my mind I remembered something
about wich the child abuse.

It seems like there wasn't an

abuse on the child but the child was present or something when
there was some alleged abuse of a mother or a female or
something.

I mean in my mind this is -- now, whether it was

this case or another, but this is what I kind of remember.
Again, I don't remember anything, you know, other than that
kind of -- because I guess I remember thinking, yeah, it's a
first time I guess -- I remember thinking that child abuse can
be something that the child endures visually or something as
opposed to the physical.

I remember thinking that. Now,

again, I'm not sure it was this case, but I remember something
of that kind.

I'm thinking it might have been.

THE COURT:

Is there anything about perhaps hearing

something in the news you believe would affect your ability to
serve?

Specifically, as I've instructed you, the only evidence

you can weigh if you are on the jury is evidence that comes in

L
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during the court proceeding.

Do you believe you could follow

that instruction?
MS. CURTIS:

I believe I can, yes.

THE COURT:

Any follow-up questions?

MR. O'CONNELL:

That was newspaper?

You think that's

where you heard it?
MS. CURTIS:

I believe it was.

I believe it was the

Tribune, is the one I read.
THE COURT:

Mr. Burmester?

MR. BURMESTER:
THE COURT:

No questions, Your Honor.

Okay.

Thanks, Ms. Curtis.

r

MS. CURTIS: Uh-huh.
THE COURT:

And you're Christine --

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT:
questions.

Ms. Roberts, just a couple follow-up

I'm going to let the attorneys ask questions in

here.
Mr. O'Connell?
MR. O'CONNELL:

You said you were a victim of

domestic violence; right?
MS. ROBERTS: Yes.
MR. O'CONNELL:
MS. ROBERTS:

My son's dad beat me.

MR. O'CONNELL:
MS. ROBERTS:

Can you explain a little bit more?

And how long ago was that?
He's 11 and he was -- he was about four
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years old, so about seven

years ago.

MR. 0 f CONNELL :

Okay

And was this only li ke once or

was this over a period of time?
MS. ROBERTS:

No, it was over a period of time.

Over

maybe six months or a year.
MR. 0'CONNELLJ

Okay.

Now, you said that there

wasn't any criminal case ever?
MS. ROBERTS:

Mo, I mean I came to court to get

custody of my son and I got a restraining order on him and then
that's -- then I didn't go back to court cDr anything, I didn't
press charges
MR. 0'CONNELL:
MS. ROBERTS:
MR. 0'CONNELL:
MS. ROBERTS:
afraid.

Okay.

Why didn 1t you press charges?

Why didn't 17
Yeah.
I was aifraid.

I was -- that'ss -- I was

I just wanted him out of my house and out of my life

and I didn't want -MR. 0'CONNELL:

Were the pc)lice ever called or did

you --- they ever call tlle police?
MS. ROBERTS:

Yeah, I went and cjot the police and

they took him out of my home.
MR. 0'CONNELL:

Is that the same time that you got

the protective order?
MS. ROBERTS:
MR. 0'CONNELL;

Yes.
Now, you al.so mentioned -- well, I
63

guess let me follow up on -- with that.
involves sort of a domestic situation.

This case also
And do you think that

the fact that you've been a victim of domestic violence may
affect your ability to be fair in the case, do you think -MS. ROBERTS:

I don't feel that it would, just

because I'm -- I don't -- I'm a fair person, you know, I don't
like particularly -- I don't like particularly judge people
or -- and I'm friends with my ex now, I mean I don't hold a
grudge or -- it was just circumstance.

But I don't feel that

it would.
MR. O'CONNELL:

What about the victim, do you think

you would have any sort of feelings towards this person?
MS. ROBERTS:
MR. OfCONNELL:
MS. ROBERTS:
MR. O'CONNELL:

Being in their shoes type thing?
Being in their shoes, yeah.
I don't know.
One last one.

You also said that

there was a witness with a burglary and I know you didn't
actually witness it yourself, it was just in your home?
MS. ROBERTS: Right.
MR. O'CONNELL:

But somebody broke in and did

something to somebody in your house, what was it they were
accused of doing -MS. ROBERTS:

Accused of -- it was ridiculous. The

little girl, she's 16, she accused my neighbor of coming into
my house and attempting -- she wanted to press charges for
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attempted rape, but when it all came down, she invited him into
my home and he was my neighbor, I knew him.

And we went to

court and they just called me because I was the owner of the
house and wanted to know if I wanted to press charges for
breaking and entering, which she allowed him into my home.

So

nothing -- I went to court but I didn't get called to the stand
or anything, I just listened to what they said.
MR. O'CONNELL:
THE COURT:

to leave.

That's all I have.

Mr. Burmester, any questions?

MR. BURMESTER:
THE COURT:

Okay.

No questions.

Okay.

Thanks, Ms. Roberts.

You're free

Thank you.
Hi, Ms. Gonzalez.
MS, GONZALEZ: Hello.
THE COURT:

Just a brief few questions maybe.

It

appears that -- I just noted that you saw -- you thought you'd
heard something about this case on the news.
MS. GONZALEZ: Uh-huh.
MR. O'CONNELL:
MS. GONZALEZ:

What do you remember exactly?
I remember hearing about the break-in

in the area, just the address.
MR. OfCONNELL:

With --

What was the -- what area are we

talking about?
MS. GONZALEZ:
THE COURT:

Was it Ensign Avenue?

Emery Street.
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THE WITNESS:
MS. GONZALEZ:

Err-ry Street?

It's just very vague

because I just remember the name and the incident.
MR. O'CONNELL:

That's all you remember is that there

was a break-in?
MS. GONZALEZ:
MR. O'CONNELL:

Exactly, yeah.
Are you sure that it's this incident

we're talking about?
MS. GONZALEZ:

I think it is.

Like I say, I read the

newspaper every day, and it just sounded familiar to me.
MR. O'CONNELL:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay.

I'll just ask it again.

That's all I have.

I already asked this in court, but

You are required to weigh only the

evidence that comes in to court through witnesses or otherwise,
documentary evidence or exhibits.

Do you believe that you

could do that, that you could not think of anything you may
have heard before about this and just weigh what is presented
to you in court?
MS. GONZALEZ:
THE COURT:

I think I could, uh-huh.

All right. Good.

Mr. Burmester, questions?
MR. BURMESTER:
THE COURT:

All right, Ms. Gonzalez.

MS. GONZALEZ:
THE COURT:

No questions.
Thank you.

Thank you.

Okay.

I think Ms. Thornton, Ms. Curtis
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and Ms, Gonzalez are fine, the ones that may have heard about
the case. Mr. G'Connell, what about Ms. Stavros?
MR. O'CONNELL:

I'm still objecting to Ms. Stavros.

I even know this, she says she thinks she can be fair but I
think it's a different matter when you actually start hearing
the case and hearing the evidence and the fact that she was a
victim of abuse before and compounded by the fact that her son
was also assaulted which was also -- as well as just the fact
that what she originally said she said she tried to blank it
out, could not remember until it popped up.
worry about with victims.

That's what I

She said she hoped she would not, it

would not affect her, but she was not sure.

So I would -- I

would ask that she be struck for cause.
MR. BURMESTER:

Ms. Stavros, I think with her

responses to the son victim seemed unable to separate that, so
I'm okay with —
THE COURT:

Okay.

I agree.

I'll strike her for

cause.
What about Ms. Roberts?
MR. O'CONNELL:

Again, what I'm concerned about in

this case is we're going to have a victim who is going to come
up and who is going to basically recant.
THE COURT:

Well, we don't know what she's going to

do.
MR. O'CONNELL:

I'm pretty sure she's going to do
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Addendum E

copies of the convictions, the sentences in those cases, the
]udgments.

Okay.

Did I represent that accurately?

MR, 0 f CONNELL:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.

All right.

Anything else before we

break?
I

O1CONNELL: Yes, Your Honor.

Your Honor, I

noticed that when we were doing the jury selection that the
State struck all women, and that's a basis for a Batson
challenge.
THE COURT:

Not a Batson.

MR. O'.ONNELL:

Whatever the follow-up case is that

extended Batson, the gender, and I think at this point all I
need to do is establish that there was a pattern.

And I think

the fact that the State used all of their peremptories on
women -- I don't know if there's any better evidence to show
Maat there is a pattern of -- based on gender.

I don't think

we had any minorities at all, even Ms. Gonzalez didn't appear
.o be Hispanic, so I don't think I'd have any based on race,
but on the fact that the State moved every single one of the
peremptories were based on -THE i/OOP'Tr

Mi. Burmester?

MR. BURMESTER:
objection is untimely.

Your Honor, I think defense counsel's
We've seated this jury, sworn this

jury, the proper Batson challenge must be made prior to that
point.

THE COURT:

Well, not withstanding that, can you give

me a basis to rebut Batson type challenge?
MR. BURMESTER:

Yes, Your Honor.

With regard to the

State's number one, the State chose to strike Ms. Valerio
because she stated that she worked for a nonprofit brain injury
type of place.

That is not a basis upon which to strike her,

but I felt her responses lined up in a way that would make her
not a helpful witness for the State and that she would be
somewhat overly compassionate.
The second witness was Ms. Gonzalez.

She had heard

of the case and seemed -- though she said that it wouldn't
bother her, her responses to me seemed matter of fact and I
felt like her responses would not make her a good juror for the
State.
Ms. Thornton had also heard of the case and I don't
recall what it was, there was something that I immediately
decided that I would make her one of my strikes.

She'd also

been on a jury and he was found guilty of a manslaughter, which
I thought was probably a one-step reduction, at least that's
the assumption.

So again, I felt like she was not going to be

a helpful one for the State.
The last one I agonized over whether to strike,
No. 19, Paul Morely or 21 Ron Hardy, I conferred with my
colleague, Ms. -- and we talked about it and she brought to my
attention he was a hunter and that she felt like a hunter would
79

know things about guns and brought that point about that
potential juror and another one.

And after conferring with her

I changed my mind and went -with Ms — and that was simply -she was towards the end.
she was not strong, not —

I suppose there was also it felt like
I'm sorry, I'm trying to read my

notes here.
THE COURT:

I see.

MR. BURMESTER:

There was this pattern of -- her

responses made me think she would be somebody, again, that
might be willing to let bygones be bygones, what I would say
overly compassionate, and it was just based on her responses
about position, her responses to little subtle things like her
teaching piano lessons and the magazines she chose.

We don't

have a lot to base these things on, so that's how I made those
choices.
THE COURT:

All right.

with your explanation,

Thank you.

And I'm satisfied

I find with regard to peremptory

challenges No. 6, Tamara Thornton, No. 7 Linda Valerio,
No. 10, Joyce Gonzalez, and No. 19, Paula Morely are gender
neutral, they are related specifically to this case. They were
clearly stated and they are specific and legitimate.
I am denying the challenge based on gender.

Therefore

I also note this

is a jury of four men and four women.
MR , BURMESTER:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor..

All right.

Thank you.

Be back in about
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